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Abstract
The first chapter of this thesis leverages micro data from 179 reproductive health surveys
to shed light on a macro puzzle: fertility rates are exceptionally high in sub-Saharan Africa
conditional on GDP per capita. The paper first establishes an important empirical fact:
the relationship between wealth and desired fertility is, on average, steeper in sub-Saharan
Africa. It then explores the links to the relative scarcity of salaried employment opportu-
nities in these countries. A quantity-quality trade-off model of fertility choice featuring a
fixed human capital requirement for entry into salaried employment predicts that a feed-
back loop can arise, where poorer families get stuck in a high fertility - informal occupation
equilibrium in which they also under-invest in their children’s education. Rich micro data
assembled from reproductive health surveys, censuses and household expenditure surveys
provide empirical support for the model’s key assumptions and predictions. The findings
suggest that differences in occupational choice sets across the income distribution represent
an important driver of sub-Saharan Africa’s exceptional fertility trend.
The second chapter exploits variation in exposure to the reform across birth cohorts
and locations to evaluate the impacts of primary school fee abolition on female education,
employment and fertility outcomes in Malawi, Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania. The findings
suggest that fee elimination improved educational attainment among cohorts most exposed
to the reform: the effects range from a 5% increase in years of schooling in Malawi to a
17% increase in Ghana. The probability of completing primary school also increased in
Tanzania, Ghana and Uganda, but not Malawi, for which I find a small but negative effect.
The FPE reform is also associated with an increase in employment and a reduction in fer-
tility. In Malawi, the increase in women’s labor market participation is concentrated in the
education sector, with a small share of women shifting away from agriculture. In Tanza-
nia, employment effects are driven by increased participation in the education sector and
self-employed retail. In Ghana and Uganda, the share of women engaging in self-employed
non-agricultural activities increases. The employment effects are largest in Ghana, where
they are driven by entry into self-employed retail, manufacturing and food/accommodation
services. Correlational evidence suggests that heterogeneity in policy impact may be partly
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attributable to differences in schooling productivity before the reform and in how the gov-
ernments accommodated the enrolment increase.
The third chapter is joint work that leverages a randomized experiment to study the
diffusion of the impacts of an agronomy training program through the social and geo-
graphic networks of coffee farmers in Rwanda. We find no evidence of diffusion through
geographic networks or from the treatment group to the control group. Our results suggest
a reinforcement of treatment effects within the treatment group, concentrated around leaf
health improvements. This is driven by farmers who attended the training sessions with
people to whom they already had a social connection at baseline. The program also caused
a re-sorting of social networks: we find that both treatment and control group households
increased social links to individuals trained in their village.
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Chapter 1
Defusing a Population Explosion?
Jobs and Fertility in sub-Saharan
Africa
1.1 Introduction
Population growth lies at the heart of many debates on the tension between economic
growth and sustainability. Ever since Malthus (1798), scholars across disciplines have
worried about a population explosion leading to the depletion of the Earth’s resources
(Meade, Meade (1961, 1967); Ehrlich (1968)). Set against this, other researchers regard
population growth as one of the key drivers of technological change and thus economic
growth (Boserup (1965); Romer (1990); Kremer (1993)). Unpacking the determinants of
population growth is crucial to inform debates about its consequences.
This paper investigates the determinants of the highest rates of population growth in
the world, currently concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa. Panel (a) of Figure 1 illustrates
that over three-quarters of global population growth between now and 2100 is expected
to take place in sub-Saharan Africa. The region’s population is projected to double by
2050 and almost quadruple by 2100. Panel (b) shows that persistently higher fertility
rates underlie this pattern, with total fertility rates averaging around 5 births per woman
in 2015, compared to 1.8-2.8 in other low-income countries.1 Importantly, this disparity
cannot solely be explained by differences in national income. Conditional on GDP per
capita, the total fertility rate in sub-Saharan Africa is almost two births per woman higher
than anywhere else in the world (Figure 2).
1Demographers recognize the region’s fertility decline to be following a unique trend (see for example
Bongaarts (2017)).
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Figure 1.1: Global population projections and fertility trends
Fertility is primarily determined by two factors: parents’ desired number of children
and the availability of contraceptives. While desired fertility has been recognized as a key
contributor to cross-country variation in fertility rates (Pritchett (1994)), much of the lit-
erature to date has focused on the impact of “supply-side” interventions on fertility decline
in the developing world.2 The determinants of demand for children in these countries thus
remain relatively under-studied.3
This paper contributes to filling this knowledge gap by leveraging micro data to shed
light on the drivers of sub-Saharan Africa’s exceptional fertility trend. To isolate economic
determinants from cultural or historical factors fixed at the country level, I study variation
in demand for children within countries.4 I establish that the dispersion in desired fertility
across the income distribution is significantly larger in sub-Saharan African countries on
average. I then investigate the drivers of this differential income-desired fertility gradient
across world regions through the lens of a fertility choice model.
I exploit micro data from 179 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) to construct
gradients between income and desired fertility, using a household-level wealth index as
a proxy for income and two different measures of desired fertility: the ideal number of
2See for example Miller (2009), Portner et al. (2011), Ashraf et al. (2014), McKelvey et al. (2012),
and Joshi and Schultz (2012).
3In macroeconomics, an extensive body of research investigates the role of demand-side factors in the
convergence of fertility rates to about two births per woman in developed countries, which has inspired the
field of unified growth theory (Galor and Weil, Galor and Weil, Galor and Weil (1996, 1999, 2000)). Other
important contributions include Doepke (2005), who shows that the fall in child mortality rates cannot
account for much of the fertility transition in developed countries, and Doepke and Zilibotti (2005), who
develop a political economy model to explain why the fertility decline coincided with the introduction of
child labor regulations in Britain.
4Previous work on the determinants of desired fertility in sub-Saharan Africa has studied the role of
cultural norms and practices, such as polygyny (Tertilt, Tertilt (2005, 2006); Rossi (2019)) and traditional
beliefs about maternal mortality (Ashraf et al. (2017)), in fertility choices. Norms are also the topic of
de Silva and Tenreyro, de Silva and Tenreyro (2017, 2020), who link the speed of the fertility decline in a
number of developing countries to advertisement campaigns calling for a shift to a “small family” norm.
This paper complements this literature by focusing on the economic determinants of demand for children,
which may shape incentives to deviate from social norms.
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children reported by female respondents and the Total Wanted Fertility Rate. I find that
around 25% of the difference in total fertility rates conditional on GDP per capita between
sub-Saharan Africa and other regions is accounted for by disproportionately higher de-
mand for children amongst the poorest segments of the population in sub-Saharan Africa,
where the poor-rich gap in desired fertility is, on average, about twice as large as in other
developing countries.















6 7 8 9 10
log GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international $)
Non-SSA SSA
234 DHS surveys
Total Fertility Rate vs log GDP per capita
To test that this steeper gradient does not simply reflect larger income dispersion in
sub-Saharan African countries, I construct a cross-sample wealth ranking of households
from the DHS surveys to compare the living standards of the different within-country
wealth quintiles across countries. I can confidently reject larger income dispersion as a
potential explanation: while households are on average poorer in sub-Saharan African
countries, the poor-rich gap in living standards within countries is in fact smaller in these
countries conditional on GDP per capita.
This study proposes that a key driver of the steeper wealth-desired fertility gradient in
sub-Saharan Africa is the relative scarcity of stable job opportunities in this region. Two
additional empirical facts motivate this hypothesis. First, the shape of the socioeconomic
gradient in salaried employment mirrors the shape of the wealth-desired fertility gradient in
both sets of countries. In sub-Saharan Africa, the relationship is linear for the first three
quintiles and becomes more steeply positive from the third quintile, at which point the
slope of the relationship with desired fertility also becomes more steeply negative. In the
other countries, the slope of the gradient in both desired fertility and salaried employment
is virtually linear throughout. Second, a simple mediation analysis reveals that salaried
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employment rates can account for about 20% of the gap in desired fertility across the two
sets of countries.
Starting with Becker and Lewis (1973), a long literature has put forward two key
mechanisms to explain a negative relationship between income and fertility: the time cost
associated with childbearing and the “quantity-quality trade-off”. I argue that parents′
occupational choice sets can shape fertility decisions through both of these channels. First,
the absence of suitable jobs may deter poor women from reducing their fertility by keeping
the opportunity cost of childbearing low (the “opportunity cost of childbearing” channel).5
Second, parents’ perception of the returns to educational investments could be shaped by
their own experience of the labor market. In settings where increases in schooling are as-
sociated with better employment opportunities, parents may be more willing to substitute
quantity for quality, namely reduce their fertility and increase educational investments in
each child (the “parental valuation of education” channel).6
I incorporate both channels into a simple theoretical framework that enriches a Beck-
erian household optimisation model with a poverty trap framework à la Galor and Zeira
(1993).7 Parents can either work in an informal occupation - namely, subsistence self-
employment - or in salaried employment. Faced with a human capital threshold for entry
into salaried employment, poorer, less educated individuals are forced to choose the infor-
mal occupation, which yields lower returns to human capital. Parents then decide jointly
how many children to have and how much to invest in each child’s education. I show that
a set of parameter values exist for which the combination of borrowing constraints and the
fixed education requirement for salaried employment can generate a feedback loop where
poor families can get stuck in a high fertility - informal occupation equilibrium. The latter
is also characterised by low educational investments in children, thereby preventing them
from entering the formal occupation themselves and contributing to the persistence of the
occupational structure across generations.
Bringing the model to the data, I provide empirical support for the framework’s key
assumption and key prediction using 64 micro-censuses covering 34 countries from 1990 to
2015. First, I compare the relationship between salaried employment and years of schooling
in sub-Saharan Africa to that in other countries, controlling for GDP per capita levels. I
5Two studies - set in South Asian contexts characterized by low female labor force participation - show
that the arrival of new employment opportunities can lead women to delay fertility (Jensen (2012); Heath
and Mobarak (2015)).
6Two papers exploiting natural experiments in the US South in the early twentieth century - the
construction of the Rosenwald schools and the eradication of the hookworm disease - provide evidence that
households reduce their fertility when the returns to educational investments increase (Aaronson et al.
(2014); Bleakley and Lange (2009)).
7The household optimisation model in this paper is akin to the one in Vogl (2016), who establishes
that, since the start of the demographic transition in developing countries, children from larger families
are on average less educated.
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find that this relationship is flat for individuals with under 4.5 years of education in sub-
Saharan Africa, with the probability of holding a salaried job being close to zero, whereas
the slope is (mildly) positive in other parts of the world. This is consistent with the
assumption of a fixed human capital requirement for salaried employment, a key necessary
condition for the existence of multiple equilibria in the model. From about five years of
education, the average share of individuals in salaried employment increases with respect
to years of schooling in sub-Saharan Africa, joining the curve of the other countries around
11 years of education.
Second, my empirical analysis confirms that less educated parents are also more likely
to under-invest in their children’s education relative to their richer counterparts, a core
prediction of the model. Mothers with up to 10 years of schooling have significantly less
educated children - as measured by the fraction of their children aged 14 and above who
have completed primary school - in sub-Saharan Africa. The shape of the relationship
between parental human capital and children’s education is also noticeably different across
the two sets of countries: at low levels of education, the slope of the relationship between
mothers’ years of schooling and the fraction of their children aged 14 and above who have
completed primary school is less steep in sub-Saharan Africa. From around five years
of schooling, the slopes are virtually the same across the two sets of countries. This is
consistent with the model’s prediction that a fixed human capital requirement for entry into
salaried employment can lead to multiple equilibria in the intergenerational transmission
of human capital.
Taken together, these two findings provide an explanation for the steeper socioeco-
nomic gradient in desired fertility observed in sub-Saharan Africa: the presence of a fixed
human capital requirement for entry into salaried employment can generate a high fertility
- informal occupation feedback loop for the poorest families.
In the final section of the paper, I test for the presence of the two channels underpinning
the model’s predictions: whether jobs shape parents′ valuation of education, and whether
the scarcity of employment opportunities lowers mothers′ opportunity cost of childbearing.
I complement the DHS and IPUMS data with a household expenditure survey from Kenya
to yield insight into the relationship between parental labor market outcomes and spending
on children′s education. Under the assumption that men’s fertility intentions would be less
responsive to the opportunity cost of childbearing than women’s, I use men and household
heads as the unit of analysis when testing for the parental valuation of education channel,
whereas the analysis of the opportunity cost of childbearing mechanism focuses on women.
Indeed, demand for children is strongly correlated with the type of work individuals
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engage in, conditional on their level of education, urban/rural status, knowledge of modern
contraceptive methods, and religion and ethnic group fixed effects. Men report an ideal
number of children almost three quarters of a child lower if they work for pay, outside
of agriculture, and all year round. I also find that households where the household head
has a salaried job spend more on each child’s education and have fewer children. These
findings suggest that parents whose employment status implies higher returns to education
are more likely to substitute quantity for quality of children.
I also provide evidence in line with the hypothesis that the opportunity cost of child-
bearing factors into women’s fertility choices in sub-Saharan Africa. Pooling together all
DHS samples from sub-Saharan Africa including labor market outcomes, I find a strongly
negative correlation between women’s reported ideal number of children and the availabil-
ity of off-farm and salaried work in their province of residence, conditional on the same
set of covariates as above. The magnitude of this correlation is twice as large for salaried
employment as for the broader occupational category of off-farm work. This points to the
greater incompatibility of salaried employment with raising many children. For women
who have a salaried job, the negative correlation with desired fertility is even stronger in
regions where such jobs are particularly scare.
To test that this correlation does not only capture hidden heterogeneity in social norms
- which may affect both women’s reported ideal number of children and the share of women
working outside the home - I exploit variation in the destination of female migrants from the
same district in the Malawi 2008 census. Conditional on religion, ethnicity, age fixed effects
and husband’s characteristics, I find a strongly negative association between women’s total
number of children ever born and the rate of salaried employment in their current location,
but virtually no correlation with the rate of salaried employment in their district of birth.
For women who migrated for marriage - the group for whom I am least concerned about
selection biasing the results - I find that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of
female salaried employment in a woman’s current location is associated with a 0.12 drop
in the number of children ever born, conditional on a set of husband’s characteristics,
ethnic group and religion fixed effects, age fixed effects, woman’s education, rural/urban
residence, and the share of female salaried employment in the woman’s district of birth.
The results of this final test thus lend further credibility to the existence of the opportunity
cost of childbearing channel in sub-Saharan Africa.
This paper establishes a new empirical fact: the exceptionally high demand for children
reported by the poorest segments of the sub-Saharan African population is an important
driver of its unique fertility transition, which will be responsible for the bulk of projected
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global population growth over the 21st century. I argue that the relative scarcity of salaried
employment opportunities in the region is an important determinant of its steeper socioe-
conomic gradient in desired fertility. Insights from a fertility choice model combined with
rich micro data suggest that a fixed education requirement for salaried employment may
contribute to the persistence of an occupational structure dominated by informal self-
employment.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data used to produce the
cross-regional comparisons of socioeconomic gradients in desired fertility and participation
in salaried employment, which are presented in section 3. Section 4 discusses the theoretical
framework. Section 5 provides empirical support for the model’s key assumption and
predictions as well as the two main mechanisms underpinning the model’s predictions.
Section 6 concludes and discusses promising avenues for future research stemming for this
study.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 Demographic and Health Surveys
The DHS Program collects and disseminates nationally representative data on fertility,
family planning, and a broad set of health indicators including maternal and child health
outcomes. With samples for 83 low and middle-income countries in the public domain,
geographical coverage of the DHS data is extensive, and the most complete for Sub-Saharan
Africa.
Due to the program’s focus on reproductive, maternal and child health, the target
population of the DHS surveys is women of childbearing age. The most common sample
universe is therefore women aged 15-49. Most survey waves also include a questionnaire
for adult males aged 15 and older, which I use in my analysis of correlates of men’s desired
fertility in section 5.
To construct income-desired fertility gradients within countries, I pool together all
the surveys that include information on household wealth and individuals’ desired fertility.
These amount to 179 surveys in total, covering 65 countries: 105 surveys across 34 countries
in sub-Saharan Africa and 74 surveys across 31 countries in other regions. I use three key
variables: the wealth index and the Total Wanted Fertility Rate provided by the DHS, and
the average ideal number of children reported by female respondents in the DHS surveys,
which I construct directly from the micro data at the quintile level.
DHS wealth index. Since the middle of the 1990s, all DHS surveys collect information
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on asset ownership, dwelling characteristics and access to utilities at the household level.
This permits the construction of a wealth index as a proxy for socioeconomic status using
Principal Components Analysis (PCA). PCA is a data dimensionality reduction tool which
involves the construction of new uncorrelated variables as linear combinations of an original
set of variables that are correlated with each other. This method is commonly used in
development to produce a uni-dimensional measure of socioeconomic status from different
multi-categorical indicators of dwelling characteristics, access to utilities, and asset counts
(Montgomery et al. (2000); Filmer and Pritchett (2001); McKenzie (2005)).
These variables are typically predictive of socioeconomic status, but many of the cat-
egories included in these indicators will be correlated with each other. As an example,
dwellings where the roof is made of palm leaf may also be more likely to have walls made
of mud and not have piped water than dwellings where the roof is made of tiles. PCA de-
composes the variation in these variables into orthogonal components, and outputs weights
for each variable. These weights can then be used to construct a score which will be lower
for households living in mud houses relative to those living under tiled roofs, thereby pro-
viding a socioeconomic ranking. Grouping households into quintiles ensures that these are
sufficiently large bins for socioeconomic status differentiation. I use these quintiles as a
proxy for relative income.
Desired fertility indicators. The analysis in this paper focuses on two different
measures of desired fertility that can be constructed from the DHS data: women’s reported
ideal number of children and the Total Wanted Fertility Rate (TWFR).
The ideal number of children variable is collected by customising a survey question
according to women’s fertility history. Women with no living children at the time of the
interview are asked “If you could choose exactly the number of children to have in your
whole life, how many would that be?”, while women with at least one living child are asked
“If you could go back to the time you did not have any children and could choose exactly
the number of children to have in your whole life, how many would that be?”
As emphasized by Pritchett (1994), we should be cautious about interpreting variation
in reported ideal number of children as capturing inherent differences in demand for chil-
dren. Indeed, women with higher realised fertility may be more likely to report a higher
ideal number of children to avoid admitting that they have children they did not want.
Such ex-post rationalisation of prior births may lead us to overestimate desired fertility. If
women - on average and/or in the poorest quintiles in particular - tend to report higher
fertility ideals in sub-Saharan Africa than elsewhere in part because of their higher re-
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alised fertility, then comparing this indicator across regions may lead us to overestimate
the difference in desired fertility between these two sets of countries.
Another indicator of desired fertility - demographers’ measure of choice - is the Total
Wanted Fertility Rate (TWFR). This methodology was instilled by demographers in the
1990s to address concerns about ex-post rationalization of prior births in the ideal number
of children variable (Bongaarts (1990)). The TWFR is constructed in the same way as the
Total Fertility Rate (TFR), which is defined as the total number of children that would be
born to the average woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and give
birth to children according to the age-specific fertility rates over the preceding three years
preceding the survey. The TWFR, however, only includes “wanted births”, by excluding
past births in excess of desired family size (ICF (2012)).
Since this measure is also built on retrospective data, the TWFR is unlikely to entirely
correct for ex-post rationalisation of prior births. However, measuring the fraction of
unwanted births based only on questions about future desires instead of past behavior,
actually produces very similar estimates of desired fertility (Bongaarts (1990); Pritchett
(1994)).
Employment variables. Most rounds of the DHS surveys also include a module
collecting information on respondents’ employment and work. Female respondents are
typically asked whether they are currently working, what was their primary occupation
over the last 12 months, do they typically work throughout the year, seasonally, or only
occasionally; is this work paid or unpaid; and who employs them for this work (i.e. whether
they are self-employed, work for a family member or are self-employed). Given that DHS
surveys are representative at the first administrative level (province or region) I can con-
struct female employment shares for different occupations at the province level to study
the link between the availability of suitable labor market opportunities for women and
their desired fertility.
1.2.2 IPUMS census data
IPUMS International is the world’s largest collection of publicly available census micro
data. The data are coded and documented consistently across countries and over time
to facilitate comparative research. Samples are available for 65 LMICs, and most include
information on individuals’ socioeconomic characteristics such as education and employ-
ment. The majority of the census samples assembled by IPUMS are 10% simple random
samples of the country’s entire population.
Most census waves contain information on years of schooling, labor force participation,
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occupation, and a broad classification of an individual’s type of employment contract.
Unlike the DHS data, IPUMS also provides a distinction between the “unemployed” and
“economically inactive” status, which is crucial for accurately measuring female labor force
participation. To construct the share of people in salaried employment, I make use of the
“status in employment” variable, which records whether a person is self-employed, working
for a wage or salary, or an unpaid worker. In most censuses, the unit of data collection
is the household, which also allows me to construct variables about children’s schooling
levels and document how this relates to their parents’ education.
1.2.3 Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey 2005-2006
The main limitation of the DHS and IPUMS databases is the absence of information on
income and consumption expenditure. Therefore, to complement these two data sources, I
use the 2005-2006 Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey. It includes information on
household demographics, a fertility section addressed to mothers, sources of labor income,
and detailed consumption expenditure diaries. I use the section on schooling expenditure
per child in the last 12 months, including tuition fees and schooling inputs such as textbooks
and uniforms, to construct a measure of average educational investments per child at the
household level.
1.3 Socioeconomic gradients in desired fertility
This section establishes an important extension to the well-known fact that fertility has
remained persistently higher in sub-Saharan Africa compared to other developing coun-
tries in the same national income range. Demographers have coined this sub-Saharan
Africa’s “unique fertility transition” (Bongaarts (2017)). I show that this difference is
largest amongst the poorest segments of the population, making the income-desired fer-
tility gradient steeper in sub-Saharan Africa, conditional on GDP per capita. Section 3.2
then quantifies the role of this differential in the total fertility gap observed between sub-
Saharan African and other countries. In section 3.3, I provide evidence that the gradient is
not steeper in sub-Saharan Africa simply as a result of a more disperse distribution of living
standards within countries on average. Finally, I introduce the hypothesis that the findings
presented throughout this section may be linked to the relative scarcity of salaried work
opportunities in sub-Saharan Africa. This is backed by another set of empirical findings
presented in section 3.4.
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Figure 1.3: Socioeconomic gradients in desired fertility
1.3.1 A steeper gradient in sub-Saharan Africa
The socioeconomic gradients in desired fertility are displayed in Figure 3. On the horizontal
axis are wealth quintiles. Figure 3a displays the gradient in the average ideal number of
children reported by female respondents, whereas 3b plots the Total Wanted Fertility Rate
on the y-axis. These gradients are constructed by taking the average of each indicator at
the quintile-region level (i.e. for sub-Saharan Africa vs. all other DHS countries), weighed
by the inverse of the number of DHS waves available per country.8 The graphs also plot
95% confidence intervals which capture the dispersion in these estimates across surveys
separately for sub-Saharan African and other countries.
A key takeaway from this figure is that the poor-rich gap in desired fertility is, on
average, around twice as large in sub-Saharan Africa than in other countries. The average
gap in women’s reported ideal number of children between the poorest and richest quintile
is 1.67 children in this region, compared to a gap of only 0.72 in other countries. In terms
of wanted fertility rates, the difference between the bottom and top quintile stands at 2.45
wanted births in sub-Saharan Africa and 1.47 in other countries.9 Thus, regardless of the
indicator used to measure desired fertility, Figure 3 documents a significant gap between
sub-Saharan Africa and other countries, not only on aggregate, but also in terms of the
slope of these socioeconomic gradients.10
While this empirical fact stems from a comparison of averages at the country-year-
quintile level, it is not driven by outliers. This is illustrated in Appendix Figure A.2,
which plots total wanted fertility rates by log GDP per capita separately for each quintile
8The total number of DHS surveys available per country that contain all the relevant variables for this
paper’s analysis - namely, the wealth index and labor market and desired fertility measures - ranges from
1 (e.g. Afghanistan) to 7 (Senegal).
9In terms of ratios, the difference, while smaller, is also statistically significant at the 1% level.
10GDP per capita differences can only partly account for the aggregate gap in desired fertility, as Figure
6a illustrates later on in section 3.4.
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of each DHS sample. The gap in wanted fertility rates across the two sets of countries is
noticeably larger among the poorer quintiles than the richer quintiles, conditional on GDP
per capita, with the sub-Saharan African estimates standing starkly above those of other
countries for the bottom three quintiles especially.
1.3.2 The role of the gradient in sub-Saharan Africa’s exceptional fer-
tility
To quantify the role of the gradient in explaining sub-Saharan Africa’s exceptionally high
fertility rates, I run a simple regression of total fertility rates on log GDP per capita and
a dummy variable equal to 1 for sub-Saharan African samples.11 I then compare the coef-
ficient estimate for the sub-Saharan Africa indicator when I also control for the gradient -
as measured by the gap in Total Wanted Fertility Rates between the poorest and richest
quintiles.
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Figure 4 plots the Total Fertility Rate for the 233 DHS surveys for which the Total
Wanted Fertility Rate is available at the country-year-quintile level, against log GDP per
capita on the x-axis. It is the counterpart to Figure 2 in section 1, but where this time
the outcome is residualised on the poor-rich gap in wanted fertility. As is visually evident,
the two clouds of residuals are distinctly closer together in Figure 4 than the raw Total
Fertility Rates are in Figure 2. Appendix Table A.1 displays the regression estimates from
this exercise: it shows that controlling for the gradient makes the coefficient estimate on the
11As illustrated by Appendix Figure A.4, the ideal number of children indicator is positively correlated
with total fertility rates at the country-year-quintile level. The correlation coefficient is 0.78.
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sub-Saharan Africa dummy drop from 1.401 to 1.051, which corresponds to a 25% decrease
in the total fertility gap captured by the dummy when the gradient is excluded from the
specification. This suggests that the steeper wealth-desired fertility gradient accounts for
25% of the fertility gap between sub-Saharan Africa and other regions conditional on GDP
per capita.
In sum, these findings suggest that the differential gradient in sub-Saharan Africa
accounts for a significant share of the overall disparity between the region’s fertility rates
and that of other countries, even conditional on national income.
1.3.3 Comparability of gaps in living standards
One natural interpretation of the difference in gradients observed in Figure 3 is that we
may simply be looking at different gaps in living standards. If households in the poorest
quintile are disproportionately poorer relative to the richest quintile in sub-Saharan Africa,
the gradients are not comparing desired fertility across the same gap in household assets and
living conditions in sub-Saharan Africa relative to other countries. To test this hypothesis,
I construct a cross-sample wealth index using principal component analysis (PCA) pooling
together 56 DHS surveys.
The notable difference between a standard PCA and the present exercise is that the
goal of the latter is to rank households according to an index capturing relative inequality
in living standards across samples from multiple countries instead of relative inequality in
living standards within a given sample from a specific country.
To achieve this, I select a subset of 56 DHS surveys covering 32 countries out of the
original 179 surveys included in the analysis because they all include the same set of
variables related to household living standards which have been shown to be important for
differentiating households by socioeconomic status while avoiding problems of clumping
and truncation as much as possible (McKenzie (2005)). These cover eight indicators of
dwelling conditions (electricity, source of drinking water, type of toilet, wall, roof and floor
material, and cooking fuel, number of household members per sleeping room) and five
indicators of durable goods ownership (radio, fridge, bicycle, motorcycle, television). I
then harmonize the multiple categories corresponding to each indicator across samples and
perform the PCA on this harmonized sample of 650,374 households, 53% of which are from
sub-Saharan African samples.
Figure 5 plots the distributions of the resulting cross-sample wealth index, residualised
on log GDP per capita, for the two sets of countries. The distribution of the index for
sub-Saharan Africa is more skewed to the left, suggesting a clear negative gap in overall
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living standards. Indeed, I find that the residualised wealth score of sub-Saharan African
households is 1.2 standard deviations lower on average. Hence, for the same level of GDP
per capita, there must be significantly higher rates of poverty in sub-Saharan African coun-
tries. However, the difference in absolute living standards across the two regions is by no
means more pronounced for the poorest quintiles. This suggests that the steeper socioeco-
nomic gradient in desired fertility in sub-Saharan Africa is not simply the result of larger
income dispersion in these countries conditional on GDP per capita.
Figure 1.5: Distribution of international wealth index (residualised on GDP per capita)
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Table A.2 in the appendix presents this finding in regression form, namely that the
gap in living standards between the top quintile and the two poorest ones is statistically
significantly smaller in sub-Saharan Africa. This is also illustrated in Appendix Figure A.5,
where we see that the gradient between within-sample wealth quintiles and the cross-sample
wealth index (on the y-axis) is indeed less steep for the sub-Saharan African countries in
this sample.
1.3.4 From the income-desired fertility gradient to jobs
The findings uncovered in this section raise a new question: what could explain the steeper
socioeconomic gradient in desired fertility in sub-Saharan Africa? This paper proposes to
focus on the hypothesis that access to labor market opportunities - and in particular, off-
farm salaried jobs - can account for at least part of the difference in demand for children
across sub-Saharan African and other countries.
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Figure 1.6: Gradient in desired fertility vs. gradient in salaried employment rate
To characterise the type of employment that individuals are most likely to engage in,
I construct two variables from the DHS micro data. The first is the share of working
women engaging in agricultural activities. The second is the share of working women who
report receiving payments from working for someone else. A simple regression of these
two variables on a binary indicator for sub-Saharan Africa and log GDP per capita reveals
two facts. First, the share of working women in agriculture is not significantly different in
sub-Saharan African relative to other DHS countries, as shown in columns (4) and (5) of
Appendix Table A.3. Second, female salaried employment rates are 9.6 percentage points
lower in sub-Saharan African countries on average, conditional on GDP per capita (column
(2) of Appendix Table A.3). This difference is statistically significant at the 10% level and
corresponds to 35% of the average salaried employment rate in countries outside of sub-
Saharan Africa. This association is also robust to controlling for differences in average
female years of schooling across countries: the coefficient estimate on the sub-Saharan
African dummy in column (3) of Appendix Table A.3 indicates an 8.2 percentage point
difference in salaried employment rates conditional on GDP per capita and average years
of schooling.
Figure 6 illustrates this: it shows that the gap in total wanted fertility rates (residualised
on GDP per capita) in panel (a) is mirrored by a substantial gap in the share of women
in salaried employment (also residualised on GDP per capita). Figure 6b shows that
this gap is concentrated in the three middle quintiles, and is largest for quintiles 3 and
4 in particular. The slope of the socioeconomic gradient in salaried employment is also
noticeably different across the two sets of countries: the slope is, on average, smaller in
sub-Saharan Africa for the three poorest quintiles, then becomes steeper between quintiles
3 and 4, and even more so between quintiles 4 and 5, leading the residualised salaried
employment rate of the top quintile to almost catch up to its value outside of sub-Saharan
Africa. This more convex shape mirrors that of the shape of the sub-Saharan African
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Table 1.1: The role of salaried and off-farm employment rates in sub-Saharan Africa’s
exceptionally high desired fertility.
Total Wanted Fertility Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
sub-Saharan Africa 1.443∗∗∗ 1.163∗∗∗ 1.379∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗
[0.222] [0.234] [0.247] [0.209] [0.218] [0.204]
% salaried employment -2.915∗∗∗ -1.653∗∗∗
[0.462] [0.487]
% non-farm employment -1.838∗∗∗ 0.048
[0.382] [0.566]
SSA x quintile 1 0.947∗∗∗ 0.997∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗
[0.225] [0.222] [0.239]
SSA x quintile 2 1.042∗∗∗ 1.026∗∗∗ 1.051∗∗∗
[0.169] [0.169] [0.196]
SSA x quintile 3 0.902∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.913∗∗∗
[0.134] [0.139] [0.182]
SSA x quintile 4 0.596∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗
[0.109] [0.114] [0.144]
Quintile dummies Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.478 0.593 0.577 0.676 0.705 0.676
Outcome Mean 3.677 3.677 3.677 3.677 3.677 3.677
Observations 895 895 895 895 895 895
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Each observation is a DHS survey x quintile. Standard errors
are clustered at the country level. All regressions are weighted by the inverse of the number
of DHS waves per country and control for log GDP per capita.
gradient in Total Wanted Fertility Rates, pictured in Figure 6a, which is also linear for the
first three quintiles and then becomes more negative between quintiles 3 and 4 and even
more so between quintiles 4 and 5.
The facts displayed in Figure 6 and Appendix Table A.3 thus motivate the paper’s focus
on the role that especially low rates of salaried employment opportunities in sub-Saharan
African labor markets may play in the persistently high demand for children documented
in this region.
To estimate how much of the gap in desired fertility between sub-Saharan African and
other countries can be accounted for by differences in the nature of employment across
these two sets of countries, I first regress the Total Wanted Fertility Rate on log GDP per
capita and a binary indicator equal to 1 for sub-Saharan African countries at the country-
year-quintile level. The estimates of this baseline specification are reported in column
(1) of Table 1. Columns (2) and (3) report the results of also controlling for the salaried
employment rate and the share of non-agricultural employment respectively. I then observe
the effect of adding each of these controls to the specification on the sub-Saharan Africa
dummy coefficient. What is evident from the estimates reported in the top row of columns
(1)-(3) in Table 1 is that salaried employment rates can account for a much larger fraction
of the wanted fertility gap (nearly 20%) than non-agricultural employment (less than 5%):
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controlling for the former leads the sub-Saharan Africa dummy coefficient to decrease by
28 percentage points whereas controlling for the latter lowers it by only 6.4 percentage
points.
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 1 display the results of a second specification which also
includes dummy variables for quintiles 1-4 and an interaction term between the sub-Saharan
Africa dummy and each of these four dummies. The key take-away to draw from this
additional test is that salaried employment accounts not only for a sizeable fraction of the
overall level difference in desired fertility between sub-Saharan African and other countries
at the same level of GDP per capita, but also accounts for part of the differential slope
with respect to socioeconomic ranking. Indeed, examining the last four rows of columns
(4) and (5) shows that the coefficient estimate on the interaction term is most affected by
the addition of the salaried employment rate covariate for quintiles 3 and 4 - precisely those
for which the wage employment gap is largest across the two sets of countries, as seen in
Figure 6b. Here again, I find no such difference between the estimates of column (4) and
(6), which further corroborates the conclusion that the share of agricultural employment
cannot account for much of the desired fertility gap between sub-Saharan African and other
countries.
Taken together, the findings in Table 1 and Figure 6 suggest that the relative scarcity
of salaried employment opportunities in sub-Saharan Africa may play a role in women’s
exceptionally high desired fertility in this region. The next section formalises possible
channels linking these two facts in a theoretical framework. One determinant of both
labor market and fertility outcomes will be a key factor in this relationship: education.
Indeed, the types of jobs that women - and their children in the future - have access to
may crucially depend on human capital investments.
1.4 Theoretical framework
1.4.1 Background on fertility theories
A large body of theoretical work attempts to rationalise the negative relationship between
fertility and income that has been documented for many developed and developing coun-
tries since the start of the demographic transition. A useful review of fertility theories is
provided by Jones et al. (2011). Two key takeaways can be drawn from these models.
The first is that theoretical frameworks that predict a negative income-fertility rela-
tionship must account for the opportunity cost of parental time, under the assumption
that raising children reduces the time that parents can allocate to the labour market. If
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the substitution effect of higher parental wages offsets the income effect (children being
considered a normal good), then higher-wage parents will choose a lower number of chil-
dren.12 Beyond the monetary value of parents’ time, the time cost parameter in my version
of the model will also capture the opportunity cost of childbearing as a function of the
type of work parents are engaged in. For instance, women working from home, on the
farm, or self-employed in off-farm activities where they can set their own hours around
their childcare duties, will have a lower opportunity cost of children than women working
in salaried employment.
In standard quantity-quality trade-off models, another channel that may contribute
to fertility differentials across the income distribution arises if richer parents also place
more value on child quality. To formally investigate the link between the steeper wealth-
desired fertility gradient and the fact that individuals in the poorer quintiles are more
likely to work in informal occupations in sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 6b), I re-interpret
this mechanism in terms of the distribution of occupations by level of education. If the
local labor market features returns to schooling in the sense that people with even only
a few years of education hold more stable and higher-return jobs than people with no
education, then low-skilled parents might be more convinced of the benefits of reducing
their fertility in favour of increased educational investments in children. In other words,
the occupational structure can also shape the value that parents place on education.
The assumption that parents’ perception of the returns to educational investments
in children may be heterogeneous across levels of income or rural/urban status is not
unreasonable in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Recent evidence suggests that some
parents place relatively little value on education: Ashraf et al. (2020) find that parents
have lower educational attainment goals for their children than the latter in Zambia.13
1.4.2 Model
This section presents a simple framework, which enriches a standard quantity-quality trade-
off model à la Becker and Lewis (1973) with a human capital threshold for participation
into salaried employment.14
12Note: in this paper I take household wealth as a proxy for parental labor income. Otherwise, under
the assumption that children are a normal good, the relationship would be positive.
13Recent research also suggests that there is large dispersion in the quality of schooling within and
across developing countries (Figueiredo Walter (2020)). Exploring the role of this variation in explaining
differences in income-desired fertility gradients is left for future work.
14The quantity-quality trade-off optimisation problem is borrowed from Vogl (2016), but makes one
simplification by removing the goods cost of children. Assuming a positive goods cost of children would
unnecessarily complicate the model’s predictions, as its effect on fertility operates in the opposite direction
as the time cost. This model thus uses the simplest optimisation problem that unambiguously predicts
a negative relationship between parental income and fertility (Jones et al. (2011)), since that is what I
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In the first period, parents choose an occupation between informal subsistence work and
salaried employment. Labor earnings are an affine function of human capital: y = a+wh,
where y denotes total labor income, h denotes human capital, w is the wage rate per unit
of human capital, and a is a positive constant which guarantees everyone a minimum level
of income; one can think of this last term as a unit of productive capacity that everyone is
endowed with. The formal occupation yields higher returns to human capital y = a+ w̄h,
but is only accessible to those with human capital above a certain threshold, h ≥ h̄. Parents
below the threshold h̄ are thus “forced” to choose the informal occupation, which yields
lower earnings: y = a+ wh, where w < w̄.15
In the second period, parents take their occupation as fixed, and optimise with respect
to three goods: household consumption c, how many children to have n, and how much
to invest in each child’s education e. In the utility function, I substitute the quality
production function hchild = θ0 + θ1e.16 θ0 is a human capital endowment; θ1 is the return
to educational investments; and each child costs τ ∈ (0, 1) units of time.17
Three parameters take on different values from one side of the threshold to the other,
capturing the key differences across formal and informal occupations that could affect
desired fertility, which were introduced in section 4.1. The opportunity cost of childbearing
is “low” (τwh) in the informal occupation and “high” (τ̄ w̄h) in the formal occupation. The
time cost parameter τ widens the wedge in the opportunity cost of childbearing between
the two occupations: τ̄ > τ . This captures the fact that mothers working in salaried
employment cannot take their children to work with them, and typically work fixed hours
set by their employer. Likewise, parental valuation of education is “low” (θ1) in the informal
occupation and “high” (θ̄1) in the formal occupation. As discussed in section 4.1, the
intuition underlying this assumption is that poorer parents with low levels of education
h < h̄ are less likely to think that their children could ever access the formal occupation
(which yields higher returns to education), thereby biasing their perception of the returns
to investing in children’s education downwards.
For a given w, θ1 and τ , households face the following optimisation problem:
find in the data. This is because the goal of this theoretical exercise is to propose an explanation for the
difference in the slope of this relationship across regions.
15I take the wage rate w = {w, w̄} as completely exogenous as a starting point. Note that even without
assuming a different wage rate for the two occupations, the fixed human capital requirement implies that
parental labor earnings are always higher in the salaried employment occupation, by construction.
16This follows Becker and Tomes (1976), who show that using an affine quality production function
with a positive constant ensures that the model predicts a negative income-fertility relationship.
17It would be more realistic, if parents typically rely on older children for help with childcare of young
children, to define τ(n) as a strictly concave function. As emphasized by Moav (2005), this would simply
predict an even higher poor-rich gap than the current framework by making the relative marginal cost
of quantity even lower for the poor. This is not useful for establishing theoretical pathways from jobs to




U(c, n, e) = α ln(c) + (1− α)(ln(n) + β ln(θ0 + θ1e))
subject to the budget constraint:
c + ne = (1− τn)(a+ wh)︸ ︷︷ ︸
parental labor income
where w is parental wage. Importantly, households face borrowing constraints: parents
cannot borrow against their children’s future earnings to invest in their education.
Given that the vast majority of the households in the samples I assemble offer at least
some education to their children, I restrict my attention to the set of interior solutions
below:
c∗ = α(a+ wh)
n∗ =










At every level of parental human capital h for which condition (1) is satisfied, compar-












< 0, ∀ θ0, θ1 > 0
The sign of the last three derivatives captures the two channels linking jobs to fertility
choices in this study. First, the fact that the number of children declines with the time
cost τ and the wage rate w corresponds to the opportunity cost of childbearing. According
to the model, women will be more likely to reduce their fertility if there are more oppor-
tunities to engage in salaried, off-farm work in their location. This can operate through a
higher monetary return to their time (w), a higher “effective” time cost of children (τ), or
both. Second, fertility declines with the returns to educational investments θ1. According
to the hypothesis outlined in section 4.1, the value parents place on education may be
shaped by their experience of the local labor market: individuals working in areas where
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the occupational structure is largely dominated by informal work may underestimate the
benefits of more education for their children.18
Without the indivisibility in human capital for obtaining a salaried job, the model
therefore predicts the relationship between parental education and the number of children
they would bring into the world to be monotonically decreasing. Adding the human capital
requirement h̄ for entry into salaried employment leads to a discontinuity in the relationship
between parental human capital and fertility n. The differences in this relationship across
both sides of the threshold are a result of the dichotomies (τ vs. τ̄ and θ1 vs. θ̄1) I impose in
this framework. This is illustrated in Figure 7a: holding everything else constant, parents
at the right of the threshold who have secured a salaried job will have fewer children simply
as a result of their higher opportunity cost of children τ̄ w̄h and their higher valuation of
education θ̄1.
The choices predicted by the model have important implications for the intergener-
ational transmission of human capital, which, in this set-up, is key to households’ asset
accumulation and hence the likelihood that any dynasty with initial human capital stock
below h̄ will eventually access the salaried occupation. To examine the long-run dynamics,
I make a small tweak in notation: let ht denote human capital in generation t and ht+1
denote that of their children. Plugging in the optimal choice of educational investment per
child e∗ into the child’s quality production function ht+1 = θ0 + θ1et yields the following




1−β [θ1τ(a+ wh)− θ0] if ht < h̄
β
1−β [θ̄1τ̄(a+ w̄h)− θ0] if ht ≥ h̄
Recall that θ1 and τwh represent the benefit of an additional unit of educational ex-
penditure and the opportunity cost of one more child respectively. As such, they are key
determinants of the quantity-quality trade-off. As θ1 increases, educational investments
become relatively more appealing: the shadow price of quantity increases and parents sub-
stitute quantity for quality, thereby increasing ht+1 for a given level of parental human
capital ht. Beyond the monetary value of parental time wh, the opposite is true for a de-
crease in τ : when the time cost associated with one more child drops, parents find quantity
relatively cheaper, and so will have more children but these will have lower human capital
ht+1. When either of these parameters shifts, so do both the intercept and the slope of the
transition equation.
18One can expect this channel to be stronger in communities characterised by very low education levels,
i.e. far below the human capital threshold for salaried employment, thus making the latter seem “out of
reach”.
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Figure 1.7: Predicted relationship between parental education and (a) fertility (b)
educational investments in children
This model embeds the possibility of two steady states: these are depicted as h∗ and h∗∗
in Figure 7b. h∗ represents the “low” steady state, where dynasties that started with low
levels of h will converge in the long run. These households work in informal occupations,
earn wh∗, and will persistently choose high n and low e for their children. At the “high”
steady state h∗∗, where dynasties that started with h ≥ h̄ will converge in the long run,
households engage in salaried employment, earn w̄h, and persistently choose low n and
high e for their children.
Conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria. As demonstrated in the
theoretical literature on poverty traps (Ghatak (2015)), the combination of the human
capital indivisibility for entry into salaried employment with borrowing constraints is not
sufficient for the existence of the two equilibria depicted in Figure 7b. These exist only for
the set of parameter values that meet condition (2):
h̄ >
β(θ1τa− θ0)
1− β(1 + θ1τw)
(1.2)
It is worth noting that the wage rate also enters the human capital transition equation.
If the average marginal return to an extra year of schooling in the informal occupation
w is high enough, households who start with h < h̄ can invest their way out of the low
equilibrium h∗, leading dynasties to eventually converge to h∗∗ by reducing their fertility
in the process.
Possible extensions. There exist multiple extensions to this framework which could
help yield further insight into the drivers of the cross-regional disparity in the income-
desired fertility gradient observed in the data. The first one is to extend this framework into
a general equilibrium model. In its present form, the framework yields partial equilibrium
predictions, which rely on the strong assumption of exogenous labor market conditions.
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Extending the framework to a general equilibrium set-up would allow one to endogenize
the human capital threshold for entry into salaried employment h̄ and/or the returns to
the two types of work, i.e. wage rates w̄ and w. For instance, a possible implication of
the low equilibrium h∗ is that, by increasing the stock of low-skilled labour in the informal
occupation, low-skilled parents’ fertility decisions in period 2 have a negative feedback
effect on the informal labor market, by depressing w.19 This type of extension would yield
predictions for the presence of multiple equilibria at the aggregate, rather than individual,
level.
Another potentially useful tweak to the model would be to examine how the predictions
change under homothetic preferences. As is commonly used in standard Beckerian fertility
frameworks (Jones et al. (2011); Vogl (2016)), the current set-up assumes a non-homothetic
utility function, ensuring that the share of household expenditure allocated to education
e increases with parental income. This implies that inequality in income may be partly
responsible for the existence of multiple stable steady states here. As discussed in Ghatak
(2015), the presence of strong income effects might lead to multiple stable steady states
too and in such cases, the policy recommendations for breaking households out of the
high fertility - informal occupation equilibrium may be different from when it is driven by
non-convexities and borrowing constraints.
1.4.3 Examining the gradient differential through the lens of the model
I now use the framework presented in this section to interpret the difference in gradients
observed across sub-Saharan African and other countries through the lens of the model’s
parameters. Figure 8 displays the same relationships as those displayed in Figure 7, but
plotting two different curves and lines for the segments of the population whose human
capital levels lie below the fixed education threshold h̄. The orange curve (line) repre-
sents sub-Saharan African countries while the blue dotted one represents other developing
countries.
Figure 8a shows one representation of the model that would predict the socioeconomic
gradient differential observed in desired fertility across the two sets of countries. On the
y-axis is desired fertility and on the x-axis is parental human capital.20 The number
19One straightforward extension that would achieve this prediction is to assume that the production
function characterising the informal subsistence activity involves labour and another fixed factor of pro-
duction, such as land.
20In my analysis of the IPUMS micro-censuses, I use parental human capital instead of wealth quintiles
as a measure of socioeconomic rankings. This is primarily because I need to test for the assumption that
a fixed human capital requirement exists for entry into salaried employment, which I do in section 5.1. I
show in two separate figures - Figure 12 in section 5.2.2. and Figure A.7 in the Appendix - that neither the
distribution of years of education nor the relationship between wealth and years of education is statistically
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Figure 1.8: Gradient differential and human capital transition equation
of children born to the average household in sub-Saharan Africa stands above that in
other countries for levels of parental human capital below the threshold, after which the
relationships are the same. This reflects two possible scenarios according to the model. The
first is that the human capital threshold does not exist outside of sub-Saharan Africa.21 In
this case, the blue dotted curve depicts the predicted relationship between parental human
capital and desired fertility in both sets of countries when h ≥ h̄, whereas, for h < h̄, the
sub-Saharan African curve is the orange one.
Under the second scenario, the fixed human capital requirement for entry into the
formal occupation is the same in both sets of countries, but at least one of the parameters
linking parents’ jobs to desired fertility in the informal occupation is higher outside of
sub-Saharan Africa, namely parental valuation of education θ1 or the opportunity cost of
children τ .22 What is depicted in Figure 8a is an extreme case of this scenario, where the
opportunity cost and valuation of education parameters are the same whether parents work
in the formal or informal occupation (namely a given τ and θ1) outside of sub-Saharan
Africa, leading to the same predicted relationship between h and n as in the absence of a
human capital threshold for entry into salaried employment.
Figure 8b shows the human capital transition paths corresponding to these two scenar-
ios respectively. Here again, all countries are assumed to follow the same path for levels of
parental human capital above h̄ - this is depicted by the two lines (the blue dotted line and
the smooth orange one) overlapping from h̄. The human capital transition path followed by
households in sub-Saharan African countries depicted here is one where dynasties starting
significantly different across the two sets of countries. Therefore, using years of education should preserve
the socioeconomic ranking.
21I consider that the relative scarcity of manufacturing firms, a well-documented characteristic of sub-
Saharan Africa’s structural transformation process (Osei and Jedwab (2013); Gollin et al. (2016)) makes
this a plausible scenario.
22One example of this could be casual wage labour in agriculture. This type of informal work takes
place outside the home and may not feature the flexibility required for raising many children at the same
time.
35
with h < h̄ will be stuck in equilibrium h∗ in the long run. That is, parameters h̄, θ1 and
τ meet condition (2), and there exist two equilibria. This implies that there is a kink in
the relationship between ht and ht+1 at h̄: intergenerational mobility in education is lower
at levels of parental education below h̄ in these countries.
Assuming, first, that the fixed human capital requirement for entry into wage employ-
ment does not exist outside of sub-Saharan Africa, then the relationship between parents’
human capital and that of their children is linear in these countries. This transition path
is represented by the blue dotted line. This line also depicts the intergenerational trans-
mission of human capital outside of sub-Saharan Africa under the second scenario outlined
above, in which both sets of countries face the same human capital threshold h̄ but θ1
and/or τ are higher outside of sub-Saharan Africa. What is represented here is, again, the
extreme case where θ1 and τ are the same whether parents work in the formal or informal
occupation, in which case the human capital transition equation is the same on both sides
of h̄.23
1.5 From Theory to Empirics
This section leverages micro data from three different sources to validate the model dis-
cussed above. Section 5.1 presents empirical support for both the key assumption and the
key prediction of the model. Section 5.2 provides evidence for the two main channels link-
ing jobs to fertility in the framework: parental valuation of education and the opportunity
cost of children.
1.5.1 Model validation
The two empirical facts presented in this section, Figures 9 and 10, were produced from
IPUMS micro-census data. The figures plot cross-regional comparisons constructed from
a set of 64 IPUMS samples: 25 from sub-Saharan Africa (the orange curves) and 39
from other developing countries (the blue curves). To account for the fact that most sub-
Saharan African countries have lower GDP per capita in this sample and that my outcomes
of interest (salaried employment rates and educational investments in children) are bound
to vary with national income, I residualise these on GDP per capita. Each curve plots the
smoothed values of a local polynomial regression of the Y-variable on the X-variable, along
with 95% confidence bands.
23Even in a less extreme version of this scenario, where θ1 and/or τ are higher outside of sub-Saharan
Africa but still lower than in the formal occupation, leading to a kink also in the blue dotted line, this line
could lie above the orange one at levels of h below h̄ but without generating multiple equilibria.
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Figure 1.9: Probability of holding a salaried job by years of education completed

































0 5 10 15
years of schooling
Non-SSA SSA
64 IPUMS samples. Outcome residualised on log GDP per capita.
Salaried employment rate by years of education
Smoothed local polynomial regression estimates with 95% confidence bands. Estimates weighted by the
inverse of the number of waves per country. Residuals from regressing salaried employment indicator on
log GDP per capita. Salaried employment indicator is defined for individuals who report being employed
at the time of the census. 64 IPUMS samples: 25 from sub-Saharan Africa, 39 from other developing
countries. Number of observations: 36,173,556 individuals aged 25-35.
Figure 9 provides empirical support for the key assumption of the model: the presence
of a discontinuity in the relationship between education and the probability of holding
a salaried job. Breaking down the share of individuals in salaried employment by years
of schooling reveals an important fact: the relationship between education and entry into
salaried employment is convex in both sets of countries, but this feature is more pronounced
in sub-Saharan Africa. The share of individuals in salaried employment is virtually flat
(less than 10% of individuals on average) from 0 to around 4.5 years of education in sub-
Saharan Africa. The figure shows a gap in wage employment rates across the two sets of
countries that is largest in the 4-8 years of schooling range, after which the slope becomes
steeper in sub-Saharan Africa, with the curves joining up around 11 years of schooling.
This new finding is in line with the two theoretical explanations I propose for the steeper
socioeconomic gradient in desired fertility in sub-Saharan Africa in section 4.3 (illustrated
in Figure 8a). Either the fixed human capital requirement for salaried employment exists
in sub-Saharan Africa only (or at least this feature is more common in sub-Saharan African
labor markets than that of other countries) or it exists in both sets of countries but the
type of low-skilled jobs available outside of sub-Saharan Africa is such that the time cost
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Non-SSA SSA
64 IPUMS samples. Outcome residualised on log GDP per capita.
Intergenerational transmission of education
Smoothed local polynomial regression estimates with 95% confidence bands. Estimates weighted by the
inverse of the number of waves per country. Residuals from regressing household share of children aged
14+ who completed primary school on log GDP per capita. 64 IPUMS samples: 25 from sub-Saharan
Africa, 39 from other developing countries. Total number of observations: 14,977,065 mothers residing
with at least one child aged 14 or above.
τ is comparatively higher in those countries.24 The latter interpretation supposes that the
outcome examined here - whether the individual is recorded as a “wage/salary worker”
in the census - encompasses some wage workers in informal occupations, such as casual
labourers in agriculture. Such contracts, which typically pay low wages, may also be less
compatible with raising many children than self-employment.
Figure 9 is also consistent with the mechanisms linking fertility decisions to labor
market opportunities that underlie the framework’s predictions. Parents in the poorest
segments of the population, facing the flat part of the curve, may have a comparatively
lower perception of the returns to education θ1 in sub-Saharan Africa. If women’s labor
market options are less likely to involve salaried work outside the home, this would also
reduce the opportunity cost of children (via a lower time cost τ) and thereby curb their
incentives to reduce their fertility.
Figure 10 plots the fraction of children aged 14 and above who have completed primary
24Appendix Figure A.8, which plots the relationship between years of schooling and the share of workers
in salaried employment for 25 samples separately, reveals substantial heterogeneity across countries outside
of sub-Saharan Africa. For example, Bangladesh features a much higher share of salaried workers at very
low levels of education than all sub-Saharan African countries and a non-linear relationship between years
of schooling and the probability of working in salaried employment, while Morocco presents a much more
linear relationship, which is more consistent with the absence of a human capital threshold for entry into
salaried employment.
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school (residualised on GDP per capita) on the y-axis against their mother’s years of
schooling on the x-axis. It is the empirical counterpart to Figure 8b in the previous section.
Two main findings emerge from this figure. First, the fact that the sub-Saharan African
curve lies below that of the other low-income countries at almost every level of mother’s
education except for the top of the range points to a relative under-investment in children’s
education in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, the figure also displays a notable difference in
slopes at lower levels of mother’s years of education, which causes the gap between the
two curves to widen until around 5 years of education. The slope of the orange curve then
increases from about 4.5 years of education, and eventually the two curves overlap, from
around the 11-year mark. This mirrors the behaviour of the curves plotted in Figure 9 to
some extent.
Examining these patterns through the lens of the model’s parameters yields different
possible interpretations of Figure 10. Assuming that the human capital requirement for
salaried employment exists in both sets of countries, the flatter slope of the sub-Saharan
African curve could be attributed to a lower time cost of children τ and/or a lower percep-
tion of returns to educational investments θ1 by parents engaged in the informal occupation
in sub-Saharan Africa.25 These could explain comparatively low educational investments
in children among the poorer segments of this region’s population.
Another possible interpretation of Figure 10, when examined jointly with Figure 9, is
that the fixed human capital requirement for salaried employment is simply absent in at
least some countries outside of sub-Saharan Africa.26 The fact that there is a kink in the
orange curve just before 5 years of education but no detectable change in the slope of the
blue curve at that point supports this interpretation. Taken together, these facts may point
to the existence of multiple equilibria, where the poorest families are trapped in a high
fertility - informal occupation equilibrium characterised by lower educational investments
in children.
In sum, these two figures validate both the core assumption and the key prediction of
the model outlined in section 4. Figure 9 suggests that the presence of a human capital
requirement for participating in salaried work is characteristic of sub-Saharan African labor
markets. Importantly, for this fact alone to offer an explanation for the steeper wealth-
desired fertility gradient, this threshold must be absent in at least some countries outside
of sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 10 shows that most parents make comparatively lower
25The slope of the human capital transition equation is also partly determined by another parameter,
returns to parents’ human capital w. I deliberately ignore the role of this parameter in explaining these
cross-regional disparities for lack of representative data that would allow me to construct a reliable estimate
of its value comparably across countries. This may be the subject of follow-up work on this topic.
26As shown by Figure 8 in section 4.3, the existence of a human capital threshold in sub-Saharan African
labor markets only could account for different intergenerational dynamics in human capital investments.
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educational investments in children in sub-Saharan Africa, where the slope of the human
capital transition path is also flatter at low levels of parental education, and then becomes
similar to that of other countries at around the same level of schooling associated with an
increase in the probability of holding a salaried job.
These findings suggest that part of the explanation for the steeper wealth-desired fertil-
ity gradient observed in sub-Saharan Africa may in the existence of a fixed human capital
requirement for salaried employment that makes it particularly difficult for the poorest
families to move away from informal self-employment in these countries.
1.5.2 The role of jobs in shaping fertility preferences in sub-Saharan
Africa
This section investigates the labor market determinants of variation in desired and realised
fertility within sub-Saharan Africa. I test for the presence of the two key channels linking
parents’ jobs to fertility choices in the theoretical framework. In order to isolate the varia-
tion in fertility preferences that is correlated with individuals’ labor market outcomes from
the variation that could be attributed to cultural factors, all specifications include ethnic
group and religion fixed effects. I also control for individuals’ total years of education,
rural/urban residence status, and knowledge of modern contraceptive methods.27
Sub-section 5.2.1 presents evidence in line with the parental valuation of education
channel, whereby parents’ employment outcomes can affect their perception of returns to
education and, through this, their willingness to substitute quantity for quality of children.
Since this channel can operate through the labor market outcomes of either parent, I use
men and household heads as the unit of analysis in this first sub-section.
Sub-section 5.2.2 provides empirical support for the other key auxiliary prediction of
the model, namely that desired fertility is negatively correlated with the availability of
suitable job opportunities outside the home because these raise the opportunity cost of
bearing children. Since women traditionally bear most of the time cost associated with
having children, I focus on women as the unit of analysis to test for the presence of this
second channel in the data.
27While the role of access to contraceptives in sub-Saharan Africa’s exceptionally high fertility rates
is beyond the scope of this paper, I include this variable in the set of covariates because contraceptive
knowledge and availability could plausibly influence women’s reported desired family size by giving them a
greater sense of control over their fertility, or shifting norms about ideal family size downwards (Pritchett
(1994)). The specifications control for knowledge only, however, as this measure is less subject to reserve
causality concerns than current use of contraception.
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Table 1.2: Correlates of men’s desired fertility in sub-Saharan Africa.
Ideal number of children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
non-farm occupation -0.455∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗
[0.054] [0.055]
works for pay -0.331∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗
[0.077] [0.078]
works all year -0.204∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗
[0.055] [0.054]
Country x ethnic group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x religion FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.272 0.271 0.271 0.272
Outcome Mean 6.283 6.283 6.283 6.283
Observations 147921 147921 147921 147921
All specifications control for the following individual-level characteristics: rural/urban,
years of education and knowledge of modern contraceptive methods. All regressions
are weighed by sampling weights (normalized by population size and number of DHS
surveys per country). Standard errors clustered by province x survey year in brackets.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Jobs and parental valuation of education
Table 2 displays correlations between men’s desired fertility and their labor market out-
comes in the DHS data, pooling together all the men’s samples from sub-Saharan Africa
that contain information on men’s employment, education, desired fertility, ethnic group
and religion.
Three measures of men’s labor market outcomes - those with the best coverage in the
DHS men’s samples - are controlled for separately in columns (1), (2) and (3). The coef-
ficient estimates suggest that each of these indicators is negatively correlated with men’s
desired fertility. For instance, column (1) reports that, holding everything else constant,
men working outside of agriculture report an ideal number of children almost half a child
lower on average. Since non-farm workers are more likely to work for pay and less likely
to engage in seasonal work, I also control for these three characteristics together in speci-
fication (4). The estimates in column (4) suggest that men’s ideal family size is about 0.7
children lower if they work for pay, outside of agriculture and all year round, conditional
on the specification’s rich set of covariates. This represents a drop of about 11% relative
to the sample mean.
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Figure 1.11: Distribution of (a) number of children ever born and (b) educational
expenditure per child by household head’s type of employment.
Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey 2005-2006.
A key takeaway from Table 2 is, therefore, that men′s employment characteristics are
strong predictors of their fertility preferences, even conditional on their level of education.
While these estimates do not reflect the presence of a causal relationship from men′s jobs to
fertility intentions, they are consistent with the “valuation of education” channel playing
a role in the relationship between labor market outcomes and desired fertility. In terms of
the model′s parameters, I interpret these findings as suggestive of parents′ experience of
the labor market shaping their perception of the returns to educational investments θ1.
To yield insight into the relationship between parents′ labor market outcomes and
educational investments in children, I complement the DHS surveys with a household ex-
penditure survey from Kenya. I find that Kenyan households where the household head
has a salaried job spend more on each child’s education and have fewer children. This is
illustrated in Figure 11: panel (a) depicts the distribution of the total number of children
ever born to the spouse of the household head, and panel (b) plots the kernel density dis-
tribution of log education expenditure per child.28 Figure 11a shows that the distribution
of total number of children born to couples where the head holds a salaried job is shifted
to the left relative to that of households where the head is self-employed (the grey bars).
Figure 11b shows that the distribution of expenditure per child is more distinctly bimodal
- as well as shifted to the right - for households where the head is in salaried employment
(the smooth black line).
Taken together, these facts are consistent with the idea that parents in more stable
forms of employment are also more prone to substituting quantity for quality of children.29
In the Appendix, Table A.4 presents these associations in regression form, controlling
285% of households, who report no education spending, get dropped from the sample in this analysis as
a result of the log transformation.
29The discussion of the role of jobs in fertility choices abstracts from income considerations. Of course,
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for urban/rural status and the household head′s years of schooling. It shows that these
correlations remain statistically significant when controlling for these covariates. The in-
terpretation of these findings in line with the “valuation of education” channel is that
households in which the head has a salaried job are more likely to reduce fertility in favour
of larger educational investments in their children.
Jobs as the opportunity cost of bearing children
The opportunity cost of childbearing argument is simple: if raising children is time-
intensive, parents whose time could yield higher monetary returns in the labor market
should be more inclined to reduce their fertility. Since women traditionally bear most of
the time cost associated with having children, the steeper income-desired fertility gradient
observed in sub-Saharan Africa could thus point to a comparatively lower monetary value
of poor women’s time in this region.
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179 DHS surveys. Outcome residualised on log GDP per capita.
Socioeconomic gradients in years of schooling
179 DHS surveys. 105 from sub-Saharan Africa, 74 from other low-income countries.
Number of observations: 3,141,292 women aged 15-49.
Figure 12 shows that average years of female education - residualised on GDP per capita
- are notably closer in value across the two sets of countries than the share of women in
salaried employment indicator displayed in Figure 6b. The level differences are statistically
significantly different for quintiles 3 and 4 only. This suggests that if the opportunity cost
under credit constraints, higher income parents can afford more education for their children. Despite the
abolition of primary school fees in Kenya in 2003, households still face other costs (Appendix Figure A.9).
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of time channel plays a role in the desired fertility gradient differential across sub-Saharan
African and other countries, it must operate only partly through female education.30
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64 IPUMS samples. Outcome residualised on log GDP per capita.
Female labor force participation by years of education
Smoothed local polynomial regression estimates with 95% confidence bands. Estimates weighted by the
inverse of the number of waves per country. Residuals from regressing Female Labor Force Participation
indicator on log GDP per capita. 64 IPUMS samples: 25 from sub-Saharan Africa, 39 from other developing
countries. Total number of observations: 14,088,269 women aged 25-35.
Figure 13 plots the relationship between female labor force participation and years of
schooling separately for sub-Saharan African and other countries. Two main findings are of
note. First, there is a very large level difference across the two sets of countries, controlling
for GDP per capita, of up to 20 percentage points. This gap is statistically significant for
the 0-11 years of schooling range. This stands in contrast to the documented fact that
female labor force participation typically follows a U-shaped relationship with economic
development (Goldin (1995)). It has indeed been observed that the early stages of the
structural transformation process, typically characterised by a shift from informal (e.g.
subsistence agriculture) to formal employment (e.g. manufacturing) in the occupational
structure, coincided with a drop in female labor force participation in many countries.
30Heath and Jayachandran (2018) review the impacts of female education on fertility in developing
countries. They find that most studies detect a delaying effect of education on early fertility (e.g. Breierova
and Duflo (2004); Monstad et al. (2008)). Several channels may be responsible for the effects of education
on early fertility, including increased use of contraceptives and delayed marriage (e.g. Keats (2018)).
The only study (set in Nigeria) to provide robust evidence of a labor market mechanism also finds that
education leads to fewer total children born (Osili and Long (2008)).
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Here, we see a much larger share of women participating in the labor market in sub-
Saharan Africa relative to other countries at the same level of GDP per capita.31 In line
with the overarching takeaway from this paper, this suggests that sub-Saharan Africa may
be undergoing a unique occupational change process - much like its fertility transition.
The second finding to emerge from Figure 13 is that the relationships are vastly dif-
ferent: in sub-Saharan Africa, female labor force participation is flat with respect to years
of schooling until about 8 years of education, after which it increases gently. In other
countries, the curve is (almost) monotonically increasing, with a steep positive relation-
ship appearing from around 3 years of schooling. One natural interpretation of the pattern
observed for the countries outside of sub-Saharan Africa is that, as the labor market starts
to yield returns to their human capital, women increase their participation in the labor
market and reduce their fertility. In this case, women’s decision on the extensive margin
(whether to participate) is influenced by the options available to them on the intensive
margin (how the labor market rewards their time if they participate). Job opportunities
in manufacturing or services, for instance, may provide them with an incentive to both
increase their educational attainment and reduce their fertility.32
Figure 13 thus points to the importance of defining the extensive and intensive margins
with respect to specific features of the sub-Saharan African context. Poor women are more
likely to be in the labor force in sub-Saharan Africa; but their occupations tend to be
informal self-employment activities. These typically yield low returns to their education
but could also provide them with the flexible working hours required for raising many
children. I therefore focus on variation in the nature of women’s work in sub-Saharan
Africa to test for the presence of the “opportunity cost of childbearing” channel from here
onwards.
I use the DHS and IPUMS micro data to correlate the desired and realised fertility
outcomes of female respondents with the availability of employment opportunities in their
location of residence. Tables 3 and 4 report these correlations, focusing on the availabil-
ity of two types of jobs: off-farm work - which includes self-employment activities - and
salaried employment.
31Since the distribution of female years of schooling is quite similar in the two sets of countries (see Figure
12 and Appendix Figure A.7), it must be that female labor force participation rates are also substantially
higher on aggregate in sub-Saharan Africa, conditional on GDP per capita.
32Jensen (2012) and Heath and Mobarak (2015) exploit random and quasi-random variation in India and
Bangladesh respectively to test this hypothesis, and find that the arrival of new employment opportunities
- business process outsourcing in Jensen (2012) and garment manufacturing in Heath and Mobarak (2015)
- do indeed raise women’s labor force participation by increasing their educational attainment and delaying
the onset of their fertility.
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Table 1.3: Correlations between women’s ideal number of children and the availability of
off-farm and salaried employment in sub-Saharan Africa (DHS).
Ideal number of children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% wage work in province -1.706∗∗∗ -1.991∗∗∗
[0.533] [0.574]
works for a wage -0.377∗∗∗
[0.046]
works for a wage * % wage work in prov. 1.567∗∗∗
[0.456]




non-farm work * % non-farm work in prov. -0.027
[0.144]
Country x ethnic group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x religion FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.362 0.363 0.362 0.363
Sample Mean 5.212 5.212 5.212 5.212
Observations 600968 600968 600968 600968
All specifications control for the following individual-level characteristics: rural/urban resi-
dence, years of education and knowledge of modern contraceptive methods. Regressions are
weighted by sampling weights normalized by population size and number of DHS waves per
country. Standard errors clustered by province X year in brackets.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table 3 displays correlations produced from a sample of over 600,000 women in sub-
Saharan Africa, constructed by pooling all the DHS women’s samples in the IPUMS-DHS
database at the time of writing. The outcome variable here is the ideal number of children
reported by female respondents of childbearing age.33 Specifications (1)-(4) control for
the same set of covariates as those used to produce Table 2 for the men’s samples. The
key difference here is that the explanatory variable of interest is the share of employment
opportunities available in female respondents’ province, which I use as a proxy for the
opportunity cost of childbearing.
The first key take-away one can draw from this table is that the coefficient on the
share of salaried employment in column (1) is much more negative – over twice as large in
magnitude – than the one on the share of non-farm employment in column (3). Column (1)
shows that, conditional on the specification’s rich set of covariates, a 10 percentage point
increase in the share of women working in salaried employment in a province is associated
with a drop in ideal number of children of about 0.17 on average. The corresponding
33As a robustness check, I run the same set of specifications used to produce Table 3 on a sample
restricted to childless women, to address concerns that the ideal number of children variable may be biased
by ex-post rationalisation of prior births (as discussed in section 2). Results are reported in Appendix Table
A.6. The coefficient estimates are smaller in magnitude but their sign and statistical significance survive.
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coefficient estimate for off-farm work in column (3) is only about 0.09. This finding supports
the hypothesis that the availability of salaried employment - assumed to be higher-return
and less compatible with raising many children than non-agricultural self-employment -
increases the opportunity cost of children.
Columns (2) and (4) display the results of a specification which interacts our variable
of interest (i.e. the share of salaried and non-farm employment respectively) with the
respondent’s own employment status - whether they are a salaried worker and whether
they work outside of agriculture respectively. Here, the significantly positive coefficient on
the interaction term in column (2) indicates that women in salaried jobs report a lower
ideal number of children in provinces where such opportunities are particularly scarce. It
shows that, conditional on a woman being a salaried worker, a 10 percentage point decrease
in the share of female salaried employment in the province is associated with a 0.16 drop
in her ideal number of children. In other words, the correlation between having a salaried
occupation and a woman’s desired fertility becomes stronger (i.e. more negative) with
the relative scarcity of such jobs in her province. The fact that the interaction yields an
insignificant coefficient estimate for off-farm work in column (4) is, once again, consistent
with salaried employment being associated with a higher opportunity cost of children than
non-agricultural work more generally.
It is important to keep in mind that these estimates represent correlations, and as such,
may be subject to more than one interpretation. For instance, an alternative interpretation
of the association between the prevalence of female salaried employment and women’s
desired fertility reported in Table 3 is that it may only be capturing heterogeneity in
social norms across provinces. Areas characterised by more conservative gender norms
may exhibit both a lower share of women in salaried employment and higher levels of
desired fertility, for example. To test this hypothesis, I exploit variation in the destination
of female migrants from the same district in the Malawi 2008 census.
Table 4 reports correlations between the availability of salaried employment opportu-
nities for women and (a) the probability that they are in salaried employment, and (b)
the total number of children they ever gave birth to. I split the sample of married women
according to four groups: those who never left their district of birth (column (1)); those
who crossed district borders around the year of their marriage, which I interpret to mean
that their primary motive for moving was marriage and not the search for work opportuni-
ties (column (2)); those whose last migration dates back to before their marriage (column
(3)); and finally, those whose last migration to date took place after their marriage. To
assuage concerns about the role that assortative matching in marriage outcomes may play
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Table 1.4: Correlations between the share of salaried employment in a woman’s district of
residence and her (i) participation in salaried employment and (ii) fertility, by migration
status (Malawi IPUMS 2008).
Never Migrated migrated Migrated
Migrated for before after
marriage marriage marriage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Salaried employment
% salaried employment in current location 0.472∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
[0.044] [0.052] [0.058] [0.040]
% salaried employment in birth district 0.162∗∗∗ -0.019 0.031
[0.062] [0.058] [0.049]
Outcome Mean 0.045 0.090 0.087 0.116
R2 0.079 0.119 0.117 0.131
Number of children ever born
% salaried employment in current location -0.862∗∗∗ -1.239∗∗∗ -1.774∗∗∗ -2.021∗∗∗
[0.291] [0.210] [0.294] [0.295]
% salaried employment in birth district -0.239 -0.314 -0.935∗∗∗
[0.257] [0.371] [0.297]
Outcome Mean 4.052 2.532 3.503 4.283
R2 0.563 0.629 0.542 0.465
Ethnic group FE X X X X
Religion FE X X X X
Age FE X X X X
Observations 104590 10140 10031 22464
All specifications control for rural/urban residence, woman’s years of education, husband’s
years of education and type of employment (farm/off-farm and salaried/self-employment).
Standard errors clustered by sub-district in brackets. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
in explaining these correlations, I also control for husband’s years of education and type
of work (whether they are working outside the farm, and whether they are in salaried
employment) in all specifications.
Two main patterns emerge from the results displayed in the bottom panel of Table 4.
First, the different coefficient estimates reported in columns (2), (3) and (4) on the rate
of female salaried employment in a migrant woman’s destination suggest that women who
move to areas with higher rates of salaried employment tend to give birth to fewer children.
Of course, the different magnitudes of this coefficient across columns (1)-(4) undoubtedly
reflect that selection plays a role in the decision to migrate away from one’s district of
birth. For example, the largest estimate, in column (4), could be capturing the fact that
women’s decision to migrate after the year of their marriage - so, presumably with their
husband - is likely to be driven by unobservable characteristics of these couples that are
also correlated with lower desired fertility.34
34These could be couples who move in search of appealing employment prospects or of a higher quality
of schooling for their children, for instance. Such couples might have higher aspirations for their own
economic situation and/or their children’s economic future than the average couple, leading them to
consciously restrict their fertility in favour of higher educational investments.
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Column (2) reports the results of the specification I consider most likely to isolate the
opportunity cost of childbearing channel from selection factors. This is because the timing
of these women’s last migration suggests that marriage, more than the search for appealing
job opportunities, was their primary motive for moving. This estimate states that a 10
percentage point increase in the share of female salaried employment in a woman’s current
location is associated with a 0.12 drop in the number of children ever born, conditional on
a set of husband’s characteristics, ethnic group and religion fixed effects, age fixed effects,
woman’s education, rural/urban residence, and the share of female salaried employment
in the woman’s district of birth.
The second noteworthy finding emerging from Table 4 is that the coefficient estimate on
the availability of jobs is much more negative (and significant) for women’s current location
of residence than their location of birth. These estimates are reported in the bottom two
rows of the table. This finding corroborates the opportunity cost of children hypothesis,
because it suggests that fertility is not solely determined by social norms. If norms around
fertility were the main factor driving the negative association between the share of women
engaged in salaried work and women’s ideal number of children in a province reported in
Table 3, one would expect the rate of salaried employment in a woman’s location of birth to
be a strong predictor of her fertility choices. The underlying intuition here is that women
born in districts where conservative gender norms are more widespread are also likely
to have grown up in settings with lower rates of female salaried employment and higher
fertility. The fact that the estimates in the bottom row of Table 4 are either insignificantly
different from zero (columns (2) and (3)) or at least much smaller in magnitude than the
coefficient on the rate of female salaried employment in women’s current location (column
(4)) goes against this hypothesis.
Taken together, the strength of the correlations reported in Tables 3 and 4 thus sup-
ports the hypothesis that salaried employment opportunities are tightly linked to women’s
fertility choices because of the opportunity cost of children associated with this type of
work.
1.6 Discussion
This paper uses micro data on desired fertility across the income distribution within coun-
tries to shed light on the drivers of sub-Saharan Africa’s exceptionally high fertility rates.
I find that a quarter of the overall gap in fertility between sub-Saharan African and other
developing countries is explained by the presence of a steeper income-desired fertility gra-
dient in the former, even when controlling for GDP per capita. Through the lens of a
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Beckerian framework supported by micro data from several sources, the paper links this
to the relative scarcity of salaried employment opportunities in sub-Saharan Africa. The
latter accounts for about 20% of the gap in desired fertility between these two sets of
countries.
Recent evidence has shown that limited occupational choice sets can generate poverty
traps (Bandiera et al. (2017); Balboni et al. (2020)). This paper complements the findings
from these studies by highlighting another set of mechanisms through which the availability
of different types of jobs may affect the intergenerational persistence of poverty. I argue that
the distribution and nature of labor market opportunities available in sub-Saharan Africa
may be responsible for a feedback loop between informal self-employment and high fertility
that persists via families also under-investing in their children’s education. This study also
emphasizes that the fertility decisions are more strongly correlated with the prevalence of
salaried work than that of self-employment in non-agricultural activities. Thus, one key
policy implication from this paper is that large investments aimed at increasing the set
of salaried employment opportunities available to the poorer segments of the population
may be just as important as improving access to contraceptives - if not more - for reducing
fertility in sub-Saharan Africa.35
These findings open up several avenues for future research. A natural follow-up study
would attempt to reconcile the fact that the income-desired fertility gradient is steeper
in sub-Saharan Africa with the small but growing literature on gender gaps in fertility in
sub-Saharan Africa. These have been documented both in terms of realised (Field et al.
(2016)) and desired fertility (Doepke and Tertilt (2018)) at the country level. Accounting
for differences in desired fertility across spouses may allow us to better understand the
pace of fertility transitions across and within sub-Saharan African countries.36 Examining
differences in desired fertility across men and women across the income distribution reveals
that not only do men typically report a higher ideal number of children than their wives
on average, but the slope of the relationship between men’s desired fertility with household
wealth is also significantly steeper than that of women’s in sub-Saharan Africa, whereas
the gradients are virtually identical on average across men and women in other regions.
This is displayed in Appendix Figure A.12.
Unpacking the determinants of this additional cross-regional disparity in wealth- desired
fertility gradients could shed further light on the macro puzzle that motivated this paper:
35Quantifying the impacts of expanding access to salaried jobs relative to contraceptives on fertility and
the general equilibrium effects of such big push expansion policies on the income-desired fertility gradient
in sub-Saharan African countries is left for future work.
36Importantly, studies such as Ashraf et al. (2014) and Ashraf et al. (2017) also highlight the possible
negative welfare implications of misalignment in desired fertility across spouses.
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the fertility gap between sub-Saharan Africa and other countries. Part of my future research
agenda will involve relating gender gaps in desired fertility by income to the findings in this
study.37 Indeed, one possible interpretation of the facts I document in this paper is that, if
jobs are especially scarce in sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest women may be relatively more
dependent on men for their livelihoods than elsewhere. As a result, their ideal number of
children may be shaped at least in part by the will to meet their husbands’ own fertility
aspirations.
Such a finding would raise two additional important questions. First, it would be
fundamental to understand why men’s socioeconomic gradient in desired fertility is steeper
than women’s in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, extending this paper’s model from a unitary
to collective framework with intra-spousal bargaining could allow us to assess the extent
to which improving women’s bargaining power might reduce the poor-rich gap in demand
for children in sub-Saharan Africa.38
Polygyny might also merit further examination through the lens of socioeconomic gradi-
ents. While cross-sectional evidence, as emphasized in section 3, suggests that this practice
is not more common amongst the poorest segments of the population, the distribution of
job opportunities may interact with social norms in shaping incentives to adhere to this
practice. The top panel of Appendix A.18 illustrates that women in polygynous marriages
tend to report higher desired fertility, consistent with the findings of Rossi (2019). The
bottom panel of Appendix A.18 plots the evolution of polygyny rates by wealth quin-
tile over repeated cross-sections of the DHS surveys for 16 sub-Saharan African countries.
While the fraction of married women in a polygynous union appears relatively stable over
time on aggregate, the figure presents suggestive evidence that polygyny rates have been
on the decline in recent years for richer women in some countries (e.g. Benin, Cameroon
and Ghana). One possible explanation could be that, as occupational structures evolve,
the outside options available to more educated women improve, inciting them to deviate
from this historically determined norm if they wish to. Future research could be directed
at testing this hypothesis.
Finally, an important follow-up research avenue on the role of jobs in explaining sub-
Saharan African’s exceptional fertility trends would be to investigate the determinants of
cross-country variation - and spatial variation within countries - in the relationship between
37Appendix D provides some detail on this, including preliminary evidence about the gradient between
wealth and the share of polygynous unions and measures of relative earnings within couples.
38The role of spousal bargaining power in fertility has been documented in other settings. In Malaysia,
Rasul (2008) finds that the outcome of spousal bargaining over fertility decisions depends on the distri-
bution of bargaining power in the couple. Doepke and Kindermann (2019) account for the distribution of
childcare duties between mothers and fathers. Future work could involve fitting an intra-spousal bargain-
ing model of fertility to sex-disaggregated household survey data on fertility, educational investments and
expenditure.
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socioeconomic status, desired fertility and occupations within sub-Saharan Africa.39 It
could help inform the design of policies aimed at lowering fertility to quantify the role of
job opportunities in explaining fertility differentials across the income distribution on a
country-by-country basis. This is left for future work.
39Appendix Figure A.11 overlays the gradient in desired fertility with the gradient in the share of women
working for a salary separately for 25 sub-Saharan African countries. While the slope of the two gradients
is very similar in most countries (similar magnitude, opposite sign), this graph also reveals substantial
heterogeneity across countries. In some countries, like Congo and Rwanda, the two gradients are virtually
flat, whereas in others, like Nigeria and Zimbabwe, they are very steep.
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Appendix to Chapter 1.
Figure A.1: Mortality trends over time by region
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Each data point corresponds to a country X year X wealth quintile.
Realised fertility vs. ideal number of children (DHS)
179 Demographic and Health Surveys. This graph plots the total fertility rate against the average ideal
number of children reported by respondents in each country x year x wealth quintile. It is important to
note that the fertility rate is flat relative to ideal number of children at very high levels of desired fertility
(7+ children), possibly pointing to biological constraints for achieving an average of more than 7 births
per woman. Gradient estimates are virtually unaffected if these observations are dropped. The Pearson
correlation coefficient for these two variables is 0.78.
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Table A.1: Accounting for the poor-rich gap in desired fertility
Total Fertility Rate (TFR)
(1) (2) (3)
log GDP per capita -1.243∗∗∗ -0.780∗∗∗ -0.758∗∗∗
[0.124] [0.134] [0.115]
sub-Saharan Africa 1.401∗∗∗ 1.051∗∗∗
[0.233] [0.211]
poor-rich ∆ TWFR 0.360∗∗∗
[0.093]
R2 0.506 0.674 0.731
Outcome Mean 4.278 4.278 4.278
Observations 233 233 233
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the
country level in brackets. Poor-rich ∆ TWFR = gap in Total
Wanted Fertility Rate across top and bottom wealth quintiles.
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within-sample wealth quintile
non-SSA SSA
Outcome residualised on log GDP per capita
Average cross-sample wealth score by within-sample quintile
This graph plots average values of the cross-sample wealth index - constructed using PCA on a subset
of 56 DHS surveys - by within-sample wealth quintile. The main finding to emerge here is that income
dispersion in living standards as measured by this international wealth index, is not larger in sub-Saharan
African countries on average.
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Table A.2: Cross-regional differences in the poor-rich gap in living standards (DHS)
cross-sample
wealth index
log GDP per capita 1.135∗∗
[0.430]










SSA x quintile 1 2.013∗∗∗
[0.491]
SSA x quintile 2 1.110∗∗∗
[0.399]
SSA x quintile 3 0.346
[0.394]





Standard errors clustered by country-year in
brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Ideal number of children (residuals) by wealth quintile
Non-SSA SSA
(a) plots ideal number of children residualised on log GDP per capita. Graph (b) plots the same outcome
residualised on log GDP per capita and share of women exposed to family planning campaigns (radio).
This analysis uses only the 94 DHS surveys for which information was collected on exposure to family
planning information (via radio, newspaper or posters and leaflets).
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Table A.3: Differences in women’s education and type of employment across
sub-Saharan African and other countries
Years of Share of Share of Share of Share of
schooling salaried salaried agricultural agricultural
workers workers workers workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
sub-Saharan Africa -1.106 -0.096∗ -0.082∗ 0.035 0.030
[0.699] [0.048] [0.047] [0.052] [0.055]
log GDP per capita 2.112∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗
[0.413] [0.031] [0.037] [0.033] [0.032]
years of schooling 0.013 -0.004
[0.010] [0.007]
R2 0.464 0.560 0.574 0.495 0.497
Outcome Mean 5.963 0.272 0.272 0.349 0.349
Observations 179 179 179 179 179
Years of schooling: average years of schooling across all female respondents aged 15-49 in
DHS survey. Share of salaried employment: share of working women in sample who are wor-
king for someone else for pay. Share of agricultural employment: share of working women
in sample engaging in agricultural work. All regressions are weighted by the inverse of the
number of DHS waves available per country. Standard errors clutered by country in brackets.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 179 DHS surveys.
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years of schooling of women aged 25-50
Non-SSA SSA
Cumulative distribution of female years of schooling (IPUMS)
64 IPUMS samples. This graph plots the cumulative distributions of female years of schooling for sub-
Saharan and non-sub-Saharan African years of schooling separately. These include 95% confidence bands.
As is clearly apparent here, one cannot reject the null that these distributions are the same across the two
sets of countries. This allows me to reject the hypothesis that the non-sub-Saharan African countries are
at the “high” (h∗∗) equilibrium whilst the sub-Saharan African ones are in the “low” one (h∗).
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Share of salaried workers by years of schooling
25 IPUMS samples. Local polynomial regression estimates with 95% confidence bands. The orange curves
plot the results for sub-Saharan African samples. On the Y-axis is the raw measure of salaried employment
rates. Estimates for the other samples are similar so I exclude them here for visualisation purposes.
Figure A.9: Schooling costs per child (Inv. Arcsine)
Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey 2005-2006.
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Figure A.10: Relationship between household head education and (a) fertility (b)
educational expenditure per child in Kenya 2005-2006
Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey 2005-2006.
Table A.4: Estimates of the relationship between household head education and (a)
fertility (b) educational expenditure per child in Kenya 2005-2006
Number of Log education
children ever expenditure




years of schooling of household head -0.153∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
[0.011] [0.009]
household head has a salaried job -0.203∗∗ 0.186∗∗
[0.087] [0.081]
R2 0.126 0.205
Outcome Mean 4.861 7.458
Observations 5514 5514
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by enumeration area in
brackets. Sample restricted to all households with at least one child of schooling age.
Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey 2005-2006.
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1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Comoros Congo
Cote D'Ivoire Ethiopia Gambia Ghana Guinea
Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Mali
Namibia Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Sierra Leone
Tanzania Togo Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe
ideal number of children (residuals) % women in salaried work (residuals)
wealth quintile
25 DHS countries. Each outcome is an average - across all survey waves - of the variable residualised on log GDP per capita.
Desired fertility and salaried employment: gradients within sub-Saharan Africa


















1 2 3 4 5
wealth quintile
Non-SSA, men Non-SSA, women SSA, men SSA, women
124 DHS surveys - men's and women's samples
Ideal number of children by wealth quintile
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20 Sub-Saharan African countries (IDHS)


















 poorest poorer middle richer richest  
more than him less than him about the same
20 Sub-Saharan African countries (IDHS)
Desired fertility by woman's earnings relative to partner's earnings
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22 Sub-Saharan African countries (IDHS)
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IPUMS-DHS surveys with 3+ waves, sub-Saharan Africa
Prevalence of polygyny by wealth quintile (% of married women)
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Table A.5: Husbands’ and wives’ desired fertility in sub-Saharan Africa (DHS)
Ideal number of children
Wives Husbands
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wife works in non-agriculture -0.113∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.109∗ 0.049
[0.032] [0.037] [0.066] [0.079]
husband works in non-agriculture -0.145∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.333∗∗∗ -0.315∗∗∗
[0.037] [0.038] [0.070] [0.072]
wife works all year 0.063∗ -0.301∗∗∗
[0.037] [0.079]
husband works all year -0.135∗∗∗ -0.101
[0.036] [0.065]
R2 0.344 0.345 0.254 0.255
Outcome Mean 5.316 5.316 6.454 6.454
Observations 36046 36046 36046 36046
Standard errors clustered by enumeration area in brackets. Controls for age and
years of schooling of both spouses, and urban/rural status of residence.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A.6: Correlations between childless women’s ideal number of children and the
availability of off-farm and salaried employment in SSA (DHS).
Ideal number of children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% wage work in province -0.847∗ -1.184∗∗
[0.504] [0.568]
works for a wage -0.204∗∗∗
[0.050]
works for a wage * % wage work in prov. 1.454∗∗∗
[0.489]




non-farm occupation * % non-farm work in prov. 0.066
[0.114]
Country x ethnic group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x religion FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.311 0.311 0.311 0.311
Outcome Mean 4.327 4.327 4.327 4.327
Observations 158431 158431 158431 158431
All specifications control for the following individual-level characteristics: rural/urban resi-
dence, years of education and knowledge of modern contraceptive methods. Regressions are
weighted by sampling weights normalized by population size and number of DHS waves per
country. Standard errors clustered by province-year in brackets. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Chapter 2
The Impacts of Free Primary
Education on Female Employment in
four sub-Saharan African countries
2.1 Introduction
Access to education is considered both a basic human right and a critical factor in the erad-
ication of poverty. The United Nations’ fourth Sustainable Development Goal is to “Ensure
inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for
all” by 2030. Indeed, in 2019, over 58 million children - and 31.5 million girls - of primary
school age were still out of school (UIS (2021)). This paper studies the impacts of expand-
ing access to primary education in sub-Saharan Africa, focusing on female employment.
A large body of evidence has shown that female education and labor market participation
increase women’s bargaining power and children’s health and delay fertility in developing
countries (Heath and Jayachandran (2018)). However, we still know relatively little about
the direct labor market impacts of expanding access to education on women’s workforce
participation and occupations in sub-Saharan Africa.
I evaluate the effects of primary school fee elimination - a reform known as Free Pri-
mary Education (FPE) - in Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia on women’s education
levels and occupations. After decolonization, parents were required to pay tuition fees to
enrol their children in primary school in most of sub-Saharan Africa. These have since
been abolished in many countries, in an effort towards universal primary education. Since
the occupational structure in most sub-Saharan African countries is still largely dominated
by subsistence agriculture, whether increasing access to primary education can raise pro-
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ductivity in agriculture and/or allow young people to shift into other higher-productivity
sectors should be of primary interest to policymakers. Due to their comparative advan-
tage in “brain-based” work, women may also be in the best position to reap the benefits
from these reforms and, in doing so, accelerate the sectoral shift away from “brawn-based”
industries (Ngai and Petrongolo (2017)).
This paper uses micro-census data harmonized by IPUMS-International to evaluate
the impacts of FPE on women’s education, employment and fertility. For identification,
I exploit variation in year and location of birth to construct a differences-in-differences
approach à la Duflo (2001) and Larreguy and Marshall (2017). Comparing the outcomes
of eligible cohorts with those of individuals who were too old to attend primary school
in the year that the policy was implemented provides variation pre- and post-reform. I
combine this difference with variation in pre-reform primary school completion rates across
locations of birth, thus providing geographic variation in the intensity of the reform.
I find that the elimination of primary school fees led to an increase in women’s years of
education completed and literacy rates in all four countries in this sample. These effects are
associated with a rise in labor force participation and employment. The education effects
are most modest in Malawi, where the reform even led to a small drop in the probability
of completing primary school for the group of women exposed to the reform.
Analysing effects on women’s type of employment reveals substantial heterogeneity
across countries. The reform is associated with an increase in the share of women working
outside of agriculture in all countries except Tanzania, where it is unaffected. In Ghana,
Tanzania and Uganda, the employment boost is driven entirely by women increasing their
participation in self-employed activities, while in Malawi, it is driven by an increase in the
share of salaried workers, although this effect is of small magnitude. Turning to women’s
sector of occupation, I find that the employment boost associated with the reform is con-
centrated in the retail, manufacturing and food/accommodation sectors in Ghana, and in
the retail and education sectors in Tanzania and Malawi. (No data on sector of occupation
was available for Uganda.)
In the final section of the paper, I provide suggestive evidence that the differences
observed in the size and direction of these effects across the four countries in this sample
may be partly attributable to differences in schooling quality. Indeed, because of the
potential deterioration of learning outcomes that may result from large enrolment surges,
the direction of the impacts of FPE on the distribution of skill levels and occupations
in these countries is ambiguous a priori. School fee elimination, by creating a significant
strain on already limited resources, could improve equality of opportunity at the expense of
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adverse quality effects on educational standards.1 To investigate this question, I examine
two proxy measures for schooling productivity. The first is the mean primary pupil-teacher
ratio (provided by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics) of each country, for which data
is available before and after the reform. Second, I examine the relationship between years
of schooling and a literacy assessment measure collected as part of the Demographic and
Health Surveys (DHS).
The findings from this analysis, albeit of a correlational nature, suggest that the large
inflow of students in Malawi and Uganda may have lowered learning productivity at the
primary level. In particular, the data support the interpretation that the reform did not
boost skill accumulation in Malawi as much as in the other three countries. Tanzania
and Ghana, on the other hand, may have managed to accommodate the enrolment surge
induced by FPE better. These countries also experienced larger increases in educational
attainment and employment. In Ghana, the country for which I find the largest employ-
ment effects, the pupil-teacher ratio was substantially lower (at around 30) pre-reform than
in the other countries (all in the 40-70 range), and literacy rates conditional on years of
education appear to have improved after the reform.
This study contributes to an emerging literature on the impact of tuition fee elimina-
tion on female labor market participation in developing countries. Since most FPE reforms
were implemented in the 1990s and 2000s in sub-Saharan Africa, researchers have only re-
cently started to study their labor market impacts. In this respect, the findings in this
study resonate most with those of Chicoine (2020), who finds that schooling increased,
fertility declined, and women’s labor market participation expanded as a result of the re-
moval of primary school fees in Ethiopia. On the relationship between female education
and fertility, Heath and Jayachandran (2018) provide a helpful review. They show that
most well-identified studies on this question detect a delaying effect of education on early
fertility (e.g. Breierova and Duflo (2004); Monstad et al. (2008)). Several channels may
be responsible for the effects of education on early fertility, including increased use of con-
traceptives and delayed marriage (e.g. Keats (2018)). Interestingly, the only study (set in
Nigeria) to provide robust evidence of a labor market mechanism also finds that education
leads to fewer total children born (Osili and Long (2008)). In the micro-development lit-
erature, many papers have studied the returns to education in developing countries (see
Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (2020) for a review). A seminal contribution in terms of
causal evidence is Duflo (2001), who finds evidence of positive returns to men’s schooling
1Afrobarometer surveys of individuals administered a few years after the reforms took place show that
over half of the respondents would prefer to pay user fees to raise educational standards in these four
countries (see Appendix Figure A.1).
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in Indonesia. This study adds to this literature by focusing on women’s occupations and
relating the heterogeneity in program impact to differences in schooling productivity across
countries.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes the data.
Section 3 presents the identification strategy. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5
concludes.
2.2 Data
In all countries examined in this paper, the objective of the FPE policy was simple: abolish
all fees that might present a barrier to primary education for children from poor households.
According to a comparative study on the implementation of the reform in several countries,
prior to FPE, the fees were used to fund all school-level inputs except for teacher salaries
(World Bank (2009)).
2.2.1 Sample Countries
Of the 24 sub-Saharan African countries for which IPUMS micro-census data is publicly
available, 20 countries have officially documented FPE reforms. IPUMS datasets contain-
ing information on education, employment status, occupation, fertility and location of birth
were available for 14 of these countries. These are listed in Table 1. I analyze the effect
of the reform in the four countries for which (i) data was collected at least 10 years after
the reform, to allow identification of effects on both education and labor market outcomes,
(ii) the variables allowed me to construct the same differences-in-differences approach ex-
ploiting variation in exposure to the reform across birth locations and cohorts and (iii)
variables relating to educational attainment, employment and fertility were available. In
countries where more than one primary school fee abolition policy was implemented since
independence, I analyze the latest reform. For each of the four countries, I restrict my
sample to all women who were in age of having completed primary school at the time of
the data collection, so aged 15 and above.
2.2.2 IPUMS data
Education. In all four samples, I use as my main education outcomes two variables
harmonized by IPUMS - years of schooling completed and literacy status - and a binary
indicator for whether the respondent completed primary school, which I construct from
the harmonized “educational attainment” variable.
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Benin 2013 2006 FPE reform too recent
Botswana 2011 1980 No literacy variable
Burkina Faso 2006 2007 FPE reform too recent
Cameroon 2005 2000 FPE reform too recent
Ethiopia 2007 1994
No information on sector
of employment, location
of birth or location of
previous residence
Ghana 2010 1996 1990 Birth location variable:region (admin 1)
Guinea 2014
Kenya 2009 2003 FPE reform too recent
Lesotho 2006 2000-2006 FPE reform too recent
Liberia 2008 2007 FPE reform too recent
Malawi 2008 1994 1988
Mali 2009
Mozambique 2007 2004 FPE reform too recent
Rwanda 2012 2003 FPE reform too recent
Senegal 2013
Sierra Leone 2004 2004 FPE reform too recent
South Africa 2011
South Sudan 2008 2011 FPE reform too recent
Sudan 2008 2011 FPE reform too recent
Tanzania 2012 2001 1994 Birth location variable:region (admin 1)
Togo 2010 2008 FPE reform too recent
Uganda 2014 1997 1991
Use previous district of
residence as proxy for
district of birth;
no sector of employment
Zambia 2010 2002 FPE reform too recent
Zimbabwe 2012 1980 No location of birthor literacy variable
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Employment. The IPUMS censuses include an “employment status” variable which
classifies individuals as employed, unemployed, or inactive. To measure labor force partic-
ipation, I use this classification to construct a binary outcome variable indicating whether
a female is recorded as economically active. Using the same variable, I also construct a
binary indicator for whether the respondent is employed. The “class of worker” variable
classifies individuals into three types of employment: self-employed, wage/salary worker,
or unpaid worker. I use this to construct binary indicators for self- and salaried employ-
ment. These are equal to 0 for the other categories of employment type, as well as for the
unemployed and economically inactive individuals.
Another key outcome measures whether the respondent is working outside of agricul-
ture, which I construct using the “primary occupation” variable. This variable, harmonized
according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO), is available
for Malawi, Tanzania and Ghana. For Uganda, I use the source variable provided by the
country’s statistical institute, which cannot be harmonized according to the ISCO clas-
sification but does allow me to identify the agricultural professions. For the sector of
occupation, I construct binary variables for each of the 13 categories in the “INDGEN”
variable provided by IPUMS which harmonizes the source variables into groupings that
roughly conform to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). Unfortu-
nately, no information on the sector of occupation is available for Uganda.
Fertility. Finally, I use the total number of children ever born alive reported by each
respondent as my measure of fertility.
Treatment definition. To build my identification strategy, I use the district (for
Malawi and Uganda) or region (for Ghana and Tanzania) of birth variable as a proxy
for the district or region where the individual went to primary school. Since the Uganda
sample does not include a location of birth variable, I impute it as the current district of
residence of individuals who have never having moved away from their district (inferred
from the ”years residing in locality” variable) and, for those who report having migrated,
as the district where they lived before their last move. This includes some measurement
error, as some people may have moved districts more than once since they were born, but
excluding the individuals who have moved districts from the analysis leaves the estimates
virtually unchanged for Uganda.
The samples provided by IPUMS are representative at the second level of administration
(district). This feature allows me to construct a measure of “intensity” of the reform,
defined as the primary school completion rate of the older (unexposed) cohorts born in
each district or region. Intuitively, the lower this is, the more the district’s population
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might benefit from school fee elimination. This treatment intensity variable is similar
to the one constructed in the evaluation of the Nigerian UPE reform by Larreguy and
Marshall (2017).
Birth cohorts are constructed using the age of surveyed individuals and the year of
the census wave. Importantly, to smooth out some of the measurement error due to age
misreporting, I group cohorts into two-year intervals. Indeed, the distribution of ages
recorded in each census suggests that there was significant reporting bias: for example,
even ages are much more likely frequently reported than odd ages.
2.3 Identification Strategy
The identification strategy exploits variation in the intensity of the reform across locations
of birth and in individuals’ exposure to the reform according to their age in the year of
its introduction. The average treatment effects of FPE on educational attainment, labor
market and fertility outcomes are therefore estimated using the following differences-in-
differences specification:
Yidt = αt + δd + β Treatmentid × Postit + εidt (2.1)
where Yidt is the outcome variable for individual i from birth cohort t born in location
(district or region) d, αt is a cohort of birth fixed effect and δd is a location of birth fixed
effect. As discussed in the previous section, birth cohorts comprise a two-year interval, to
smooth out some of the measurement error introduced by age misreporting.
Treatmentid measures individual i’s “intensity of exposure′′ to the reform, constructed
using pre-reform primary school completion rates in individual i’s location of birth: Treatmentid =
1 − Primaryd where Primaryd is the mean primary school completion rate of the older
cohorts who were educated in location d in the decade preceding the reform. The main
effects (Postit and Treatmentid) are not visible in equation (1) because they are controlled
for by the cohort of birth and location of birth fixed effects.
Defining cohort exposure to FPE. Postit is a binary variable indicating whether
individual i from birth cohort t was eligible to benefit from the FPE reform - i.e. whether
they were in age of attending primary school (or attending it in the future, if too young)
at the time of its implementation. The individuals who were older than the official age for
finishing primary school (14 in the three countries examined in this study) in the year that
the reform was implemented constitute the “pre-reform” group. Those who were younger
- i.e. 14 years old or less when the reform was launched - constitute the “post-reform”
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group. Officially the age of primary school entry is 6 in Ghana, Malawi and Uganda and
7 in Tanzania. I include the “partially treated” individuals - those aged 7-14 in the year
of the reform - in the “exposed” group, because many of them likely benefited from the
elimination of fees. First, as a result of delayed entry or grade repetition - both very
common in these countries prior to the reform (World Bank (2009)) - many children in
this group may in fact have been in the early stages of their primary school education when
FPE was launched. Second, other individuals might have simply extended the time spent
in school thanks to the reform, if tuition fees previously led some financially-constrained
parents to pull their children out of school before they could reach the end of the cycle.
The main identifying assumption that has to hold in this framework to ensure that the
differences-in-differences strategy will yield estimates of the causal effects of the reforms
is that of ‘parallel trends’. That is, it must be plausible that the difference in education
levels between high- and low-intensity areas would have remained the same after the year
of the FPE reform if it had not been implemented. If this assumption holds, any change
in the relative trends in education levels between the ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ locations
after FPE can be credibly attributed to the causal impact of the reform.
It is therefore necessary to examine the trends of the control and treatment groups
before the launch of FPE to be able to draw accurate conclusions about any changes in
the relative trends in education levels of treatment and control locations post-reform. To
test the validity of this identification assumption, I therefore estimate:
Yidt = αt + δd +
∑
t
βtTreatmentid ×Birthcohortit + εidt (2.2)
where Birthcohortit is a dummy equal to 1 if individual i was born in cohort t. Evidence
that the parallel slopes assumption holds will be reflected in βt estimates that are insignifi-
cantly different from zero for all cohorts preceding the oldest cohort of individuals exposed
to the reform (i.e. the ‘first’ of the ‘post-reform’ cohorts). The results of this test are
discussed in section 4.1.
Another possible threat to this identification strategy would be the simultaneity of
the FPE reform with other policies that could have affected the treatment and control
areas differentially and around the same time. However, to the best of my knowledge, the
introduction of FPE did not coincide with other policy changes in any of these countries.
Finally, it is important to note that I restrict my analysis to a reduced-form approach.
First, this study seeks to estimate the average effects of the FPE reforms on female educa-
tion and employment, whereas using these policies as an instrument for education would
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26-27 22-23 18-19 14-15 10-11 6-7 2-3
Age in 1997
Uganda
Treatmentid×1[Birthcohortit] coefficient estimates from specification (2) along with their 95% confidence
intervals. The omitted category is the interaction of Treatmentid with the oldest cohort. Standard errors
are clustered at the location of birth X birth cohort level. Location of birth variable defined as (i) region
of birth for Ghana and Tanzania; (ii) district of birth for Malawi and (iii) district of residence before last
migration for individuals who previously resided in a different district and current district for those who
never moved districts.
imply estimating the causal effect of education on occupational choice, which is beyond
the scope of this paper. It is also arguable that the reform would not make a plausibly
excludable instrument for education. For instance, another possible channel of impact of
the reform on children’s occupations than education is an income effect. Indeed, families
who would have sent their children to primary school even in absence of the reform could
have reallocated these savings towards other productive investments.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Testing for pre-reform parallel trends
Figure 1 plots the estimates of the βt coefficients from specification (2), where the outcome
variable is years of schooling. Cohorts to the left of the shaded area are classified as
“pre-reform” as they were too old to be eligible to benefit from FPE at the time of its
implementation. Cohorts within the shaded area and to the right of the shaded area
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are classified as “post-reform”. Cohorts within the shaded area constitute the “partially
treated” group and those to the right of the shaded area make up the “fully treated” group,
since they were eligible to benefit from the reform throughout the entire length of their
primary school cycle.
Overall, these estimates are fairly consistent with the identifying assumption that fe-
male years of schooling were following parallel trends across locations with different primary
school completion rates prior to the launch of the reform. In Malawi and Ghana (the two
upper panels), all estimates of the coefficients on the interaction between the Treatmentid
and birth cohort variables lie in a 95% confidence interval around zero. We see some evi-
dence of differential time effects for the partially treated cohorts, and the estimates increase
sharply for the ′′fully treated cohorts′′. This is in line with the assumption that the reform
led the higher-intensity locations to catch up to their lower-intensity counterparts in terms
of educational attainment.
The Tanzania results paint a similar picture, except that some of the estimates for
cohorts aged 22-29 in 2001 also lie significantly above zero, suggesting that the higher-
intensity locations were starting to show signs of catching up to the lower-intensity regions
in terms of female educational attainment about a decade ahead of the reform. However,
the estimates for cohorts aged 14-21 in 2001 are all insignificantly different from zero, and
from there onward we see the difference-in-difference estimate increase with the length of
exposure to the reform.
Finally, the Uganda estimates are insignificantly different from zero for all pre-reform
cohorts and for the partially treated cohorts, and the βt coefficient estimates are statis-
tically significantly positive only for the fully treated cohorts. While the estimates for
pre-reform cohorts are all insignificantly different from zero, they point to a widening gap
in female years of schooling between higher- and lower-intensity districts in the years lead-
ing up to the reform. This could raise concerns that the differential trend break that
follows could simply be the result of mean reversion (namely, that the higher-intensity
districts would have caught up to the lower-intensity districts even without the reform).
Nonetheless, the upward jump that can be observed for the fully treated cohorts should
provide some reassurance that this alternative interpretation is less likely than that of the
parallel slopes assumption.
2.4.2 Average treatment effects
Education effects. The main effects of the FPE reform on female educational attainment
are reported in Table 2. The estimates show that years of schooling and literacy rates
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Table 2.2: Education effects
Malawi Uganda Ghana Tanzania
Years of schooling
Treatment x Post 0.217* 0.752*** 0.976*** 0.722***
[0.114] [0.139] [0.320] [0.247]
Sample Mean, Post=0 4.181 4.756 5.675 5.644
Completed primary
Treatment x Post -0.030*** 0.105*** 0.091*** 0.220***
[0.008] [0.020] [0.027] [0.026]
Sample Mean, Post=0 0.239 0.414 0.521 0.702
Literate
Treatment x Post 0.068*** 0.145*** 0.180*** 0.256***
[0.022] [0.022] [0.039] [0.026]
Sample Mean, Post=0 0.612 0.531 0.627 0.753
Cohort of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 258,626 617,551 541,524 951,568
Standard errors are clustered at the location of birth x cohort of birth level.
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10.
increased significantly with the FPE reform. The estimated effects on years of schooling
range from a 0.22 year increase in Malawi to a 0.98 increase in Ghana. These correspond
to 5% and 17% of the mean of unexposed cohorts respectively. Literacy effects range from
a 7 percentage point increase in Malawi to a 26 percentage point increase in Tanzania. The
final outcome analysed here is the probability of finishing primary school, for which I find
positive effects in Uganda, Ghana and Tanzania, but a 3 percentage point drop (significant
at the 1% level) for Malawi. In the other countries, the estimated effect ranges from a 9
percentage point increase in Ghana to a 22 percentage point increase in Tanzania.
Taken together, these results thus reveal substantial heterogeneity in the magnitude of
the educational attainment impacts of the reform, with Malawi recording the most modest
while the other three countries exhibit much larger effects. The negative effect on primary
school completion detected in the Malawi sample could point to congestion effects having
led some individuals - who would have completed primary school in absence of the reform
- to drop out before the end of the primary school cycle.
Labor market participation and employment. Since this paper seeks to evaluate
the reduced form impacts of the FPE reform on female labor force participation and em-
ployment, the next part of the analysis follows the same steps as those used to assess the
effects of the policy on educational attainment. First, Figure 2 plots the estimates of the
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Figure 2.2: Treatment X birth cohort estimates from specification (2)
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Age in 1997
Uganda
Treatmentid×1[Birthcohortit] coefficient estimates from specification (2) along with their 95% confidence
intervals. The omitted category is the interaction of Treatmentid with the oldest cohort. Standard errors
are clustered at the location of birth X birth cohort level. Location of birth variable defined as (i) region
of birth for Ghana and Tanzania; (ii) district of birth for Malawi and (iii) district of residence before last
migration for individuals who previously resided in a different district and current district for those who
never moved districts.
βt coefficients from specification (2), but this time using female labor force participation
as the outcome. The Malawi and Ghana estimates support the hypothesis that the reform
led to an increase in female labor force participation: in both samples, the coefficient esti-
mates are insignificantly different from zero for all cohorts who were too old to benefit from
FPE at the time of its implementation, while women who were aged 10-11 or younger and
grew up in higher-intensity locations are more likely to participate in the labor market.
This pattern is more pronounced for the youngest cohorts, where the divergence is most
evident in Ghana for individuals aged 6-7 and younger in 1996. This first set of results
thus suggests that the FPE policies were associated with a boost in female labor force
participation in these two countries.
The coefficient estimates for Tanzania and Uganda, displayed in the two lower panels
of Figure 2, are noticeably less convincing. While all estimates are significantly positive for
the partially and fully treated cohorts in both countries - with a significant jump in their
magnitude for the fully treated cohorts observed in Uganda - the fact that the pre-reform
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estimates are (almost) monotonically increasing over time, starting from before the reform,
raises the concern that female employment would have undergone differential trends even
in absence of the reform in these two countries. To isolate the effect of the reform from
differential trends in labor demand factors, I control for birth location-specific linear trends
when running specification (1) on the Tanzania and Uganda samples (region and district
trends respectively).
The first five rows of Table 3 display the results of running specification (1) on different
employment outcomes. As these are the results of a linear probability model specification,
I do not discuss the actual value of the estimates themselves, and instead focus on the
relative magnitudes of the effects observed across the four countries.
The top two rows present “extensive margin” effects: the changes in labor market par-
ticipation (i.e. the probability of being recorded as “economically active” in the census)
and employment status (whether the individual is recorded as employed) associated with
the FPE policy. These effects are statistically significantly positive for all four countries,
with the smallest effects observed in Malawi and the largest in Ghana. The relative mag-
nitude of these estimates across countries is thus consistent with that of the educational
attainment effects reported in Table 2.
The third, fourth and fifth row of Table 3 report the changes in the share of women in
different types of employment associated with FPE: whether they work outside of agricul-
ture, whether they have a salaried job and whether they are self-employed. Each of these
three indicators is equal to 1 for women whose primary occupation is outside of agriculture,
who work for a wage or for themselves respectively, and 0 for all other women (including
those who are unemployed or outside the labor force). This allows me to evaluate the
effects of FPE on the overall distribution of adult women’s economic activities.
Two key facts emerge from this section of the table. In the third row, we see that the
reform was associated with an increase in the share of women reporting working outside of
agriculture in Malawi, Uganda and Ghana, but not in Tanzania, where the estimated effect
is not statistically significantly different from zero. The fourth and fifth rows show that
in Uganda, Ghana and Tanzania, the boost in labor force participation and employment
is driven entirely by increases in self-employment, whereas in Malawi it is driven by an
increase in the share of women in salaried jobs.2
2Interestingly, the joint findings on non-agricultural work and self-employment for Tanzania suggest
that the FPE-induced employment boost was driven by an increase in self-employment of similar proportion
across the agricultural and non-agricultural sector.
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Table 2.3: Labor Force Participation, Employment and Fertility
Malawi Uganda Ghana Tanzania
Economically Active
Treatment x Post 0.037** 0.042*** 0.177*** 0.139***
[0.017] [0.011] [0.038] [0.050]
Sample Mean, Post=0 0.793 0.894 0.884 0.773
Employed
Treatment x Post 0.041** 0.066*** 0.202*** 0.172***
[0.016] [0.015] [0.040] [0.049]
Sample Mean, Post=0 0.611 0.884 0.848 0.756
Non-agricultural occupation
Treatment x Post 0.026** 0.057*** 0.056*** -0.032
[0.011] [0.016] [0.020] [0.039]
Sample Mean, Post=0 0.594 0.254 0.704 0.494
Wage/salary worker
Treatment x Post 0.048*** 0.010 0.020 0.040
[0.012] [0.008] [0.015] [0.046]
Sample Mean, Post=0 0.091 0.322 0.105 0.066
Self-employed
Treatment x Post -0.009 0.046*** 0.218*** 0.129**
[0.009] [0.011] [0.038] [0.050]
Sample Mean, Post=0 0.470 0.506 0.664 0.662
Number of children ever born
Treatment x Post -0.604*** -0.877*** -1.131*** -0.469**
[0.070] [0.088] [0.141] [0.209]
Sample Mean, Post=0 4.725 5.869 3.313 4.095
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location of birth trend No Yes No Yes
Observations 258,626 617,551 541,524 951,568
Changing the definition of labor force participants to include students (which
IPUMS records as “inactive”) yields very similar estimates. The Uganda esti-
-mates are robust to excluding the movers who were over primary school age
when they last moved districts. Standard errors are clustered at the location
of birth x cohort of birth level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10.
86
Finally, the last row of Table 3 shows that the reform is associated with a significant
decrease in women’s fertility, as measured by the number of live children they gave birth
to. These estimates range from a drop in about 0.5 births in Malawi and Tanzania to over
1 birth in Ghana.
In sum, the findings laid out in Table 3 suggest that FPE led a significant share of
women to reduce their fertility in favour of increased participation in labor market activi-
ties. One possible mechanism behind these results is that FPE raised the opportunity cost
of women’s time in these countries, leading them to substitute away from childbearing.3
This explanation would imply that there exist positive returns to primary education in the
labor market.
That the employment boost associated with FPE is accompanied by a drop in fertility in
all four countries is perhaps not surprising, as a number of studies have demonstrated that
increasing female schooling leads to reductions in fertility (see Heath and Jayachandran
(2018) for a review). One may worry that, in fact, the employment effects documented in
Table 3 are only a consequence of this drop in fertility, if having fewer children increases
women’s ability to participate in the labor market. While this study does not provide
evidence for the order of the links in this causal chain, the fact that we find substantial
fertility effects across four countries with a variety of employment effects, is somewhat
reassuring. Indeed, this drop in fertility is associated with a boost in self-employment -
which is arguably more compatible with raising many children than salaried employment -
in Uganda, Ghana and Tanzania, whereas it is associated with an increase in the share of
salaried workers in Malawi. This combination of findings is, on the whole, consistent with
the hypothesis that an increase in schooling enlarges women’s opportunity set in the labor
market.
In the final step of this reduced-form analysis, I break down the employment results
from Table 3 by sector of occupation. As mentioned in section 3, this variable is constructed
by IPUMS using the ISIC classification of industries to harmonize sector codes across
samples. It is available for Malawi, Ghana and Tanzania, but not Uganda. Figure 3
highlights the source of the occupational shifts observed for individuals most exposed to
the FPE reform in each country.
The first panel shows a small shift away from agriculture towards education and retail
in Malawi. The largest positive effect is also the most precisely estimated: women young
enough to have benefited from FPE are 2.4 percentage points more likely to work in the
3What we cannot infer from these results is whether the reduction in the number of children born
is driven by women simply delaying their fertility as a result of staying in school longer or by a drop in
desired fertility, which would result in lower total fertility.
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education sector after the reform. This is consistent with the positive salaried employment
effect detected for Malawi: it suggests that much of the employment boost associated with
the FPE reform is driven by an increase in the share of teachers. This is perhaps not
surprising, as the FPE policy itself boosted demand for additional teachers (World Bank
(2009)). Thus, an important implication of this analysis is that FPE was not associated
with substantial occupational change in Malawi, aside from an increase in the occupational
share of the education sector to accommodate the enrolment increase induced by the reform.
Figure 2.3: DD coefficient estimates from specification (2) where Y is a binary indicator
for each sector of occupation
In Ghana, lower participation in agriculture is associated with a substantial shift into
retail activities as well increased participation in manufacturing and food and accommo-
dation services. The magnitude of the retail effect is particularly large, at almost 18
percentage points, up from a sample mean of 25% for the unexposed cohorts. These re-
sults, when examined jointly with the substantial increase in the share of women engaging
in self-employed activities reported in Table 3 and the educational attainment effects of
Table 2, form an internally coherent story. They suggest that expanding access to primary
education led a substantial share of women to acquire basic literacy and numeracy skills,
which may have enabled them to start engaging in self-employed activities in the retail
and food service industry.
The bottom left panel plots the coefficient estimates for Tanzania. Here, women most
exposed to the reform seem to increase their participation in agriculture - although the
standard errors are large for this estimate so it is not statistically significant - and in the
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education and retail sectors. Here again, the boost to female self-employment reported
in Table 3 suggests that the FPE policy may have equipped more women with the basic
skills necessary for engaging in self-employed retail activities. The results on agriculture
are somewhat less intuitive. However, they are in line with the findings of a recent study
of the 1962 Universal Primary Education policy in Tanzania which shows that increased
access to primary education induced a statistically significant increase in the probability of
working in agriculture (Delesalle (2019)). This suggests that there may be positive returns
to basic education in the agricultural sector in Tanzania.
2.4.3 Impact heterogeneity and schooling quality
The analysis presented in section 4.2 uncovers substantial heterogeneity in the magnitude
and nature of the impact of FPE on female education and employment outcomes. This
section relates these differences to variation in schooling quality indicators over time across
the four countries.
Figure 4 plots the evolution of primary pupil-teacher ratios over time at the national
level for each country. The first striking difference that emerges from this set of figures is
the enormous gap between Malawi and the other countries. Before the reform, the average
pupil-teacher ratio at the primary level stood at almost 70:1 in Malawi, compared to just
below 40:1 in Uganda and Tanzania and around 30:1 in Ghana. This finding is suggestive
of lower education quality in Malawi relative to the other countries prior to the reform. The
pupil-teacher ratio is much lower in Ghana, the country for which I find the largest impact
of the reform on years of schooling and employment (see Tables 2 and 3 respectively).
Interestingly, there is no significant jump in the pupil-teacher ratio in either Ghana
or Malawi around the time of the reform - in fact, in Malawi this indicator was on a
downward trend between 1991 and 1996.4 Indeed, governments invested in the recruitment
and deployment of teachers in both countries to sustain the large, FPE-induced enrolment
surge - although many of these new teachers had not been properly trained by the time
they were deployed (World Bank (2009)).
Figure 4 suggests that Uganda and Tanzania experienced similar patterns in the evolu-
tion of pupil-teacher ratios at the primary level. This indicator was on a relatively stable
trend, averaging around 40:1, in the years leading up to FPE, at which point it jumped
4Note that this does not mean that the reform did not lead to any increases in the pupil-teacher ratio.
As documented by Figueiredo Walter (2020), there exists large dispersion in class size and pupil-teacher
ratios at the primary level within developing countries, and policy evidence suggests that such disparities
were exacerbated by FPE (World Bank (2009)). Since the enrolment surge was largest in high-intensity
areas, it is very possible that it is precisely in those regions that the pupil-teacher ratio increased, despite
nationwide deployments of additional teachers.
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by almost 50%, and then gradually declined from about 4 years after the reform. This
points to possible congestion effects immediately after the reform in these countries, which
may have dampened over time as the governments increased capacity and allocated more
resources to the primary education sector in response to the enrolment surge.











































The data used to produce the top left figure comes from the Malawi Ministry of Education. The UNESCO
Institute for Statistics provided the data for Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda.
How do the trends observed in Figure 4 translate to learning outcomes? The IPUMS
data do not contain information that would allow me to assess the impacts of school fee
abolition on skill levels. The literacy measure is self-reported and as such does not provide
an objective indicator of literacy skills. Therefore, for this final piece of analysis I make
use of the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). Recent DHS waves include a literacy
variable that was collected by asking respondents with less than secondary school education
to read aloud a sentence on a card. I use this variable to construct an indicator equal to 1
for respondents who were classified as “able to read [the] whole sentence” and 0 otherwise.
Figure 5 plots the average of this measure by years of education completed, separately
for women exposed and not exposed to the reform. Here, I focus on two groups: women
aged 0-7 at the time of the reform, who were therefore eligible to fully benefit from it,
and women aged 15-25, who were too old to enrol in primary school when the reform was
launched. In Malawi and Uganda, these graphs, albeit only indicative, suggest that the
productivity of primary schooling may have decreased after the reform: individuals who
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completed 1-5 years of schooling in Malawi and 2-7 years of schooling in Uganda were on
average less likely to know how to read a whole sentence after FPE than before the reform.
Simple regression estimates (not reported for conciseness) indicate that the literacy rate
of the exposed cohorts, conditional on years of schooling, was 4 and 2 percentage point
lower than that of the older cohorts in Uganda and Malawi respectively. In Ghana, a gap
is observed in the other direction: individuals exposed to the 1996 policy are 11 percentage
point more likely, conditional on total years of schooling completed, to be able to read a
whole sentence compared to the older cohorts. Finally, in Tanzania, the evidence does not
point to a change in the literacy-years of schooling relationship in either direction.
The changes documented in Figure 5, while by no means conclusive due to their cor-
relational nature, provide some insight into the differences in program impact observed
across the four countries. First, they point to a decrease in the learning productivity of the
primary schooling system induced by the large inflow of students in Malawi and Uganda.5
Second, they suggest that Tanzania and Ghana may have managed to accommodate the
5Another possibility is that the students who were induced to enrol in primary school as a result of the
reform were of lower ability than those that would have enrolled even if fees had not been eliminated. This
trait could be correlated with their families’ lower willingness to pay for education prior to the reform. I
cannot address this selection concern but I consider this a much less plausible explanation for the gaps
observed in Uganda and Tanzania than the schooling productivity mechanism. The adverse quality effects
of the reform have been widely documented (e.g. World Bank (2009), Riddell (2003)) and this channel is
not consistent with the fact that Uganda and Malawi had the lowest rates of primary school completion
prior to the reform (0.41 and 0.24 respectively) among the four countries in this sample, so we would not
expect the set of individuals affected by FPE to be of substantially worse ability than those in Tanzania
and Ghana.
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enrolment surge induced by the FPE policy better than Malawi and Uganda, since the
relationship between years of schooling and literacy appears to have been unaffected in
Tanzania (at least from comparing women aged 0-7 to those aged 15-25 in 2001) and to
have actually improved in Ghana seven years after the reform. This would be consistent
with the conclusion from Table 2 that the FPE reform had relatively large impacts on edu-
cational attainment and is also associated with a substantial increase in female employment
(Table 3) in these two countries - and in Ghana especially.
Malawi is the country for which section 4.2 documents the most modest education
and employment effects. The findings presented in this section lend support to the causal
interpretation of the reduced-form effects of the FPE policy on employment in Table 3 and
provide a possible explanation to the negative effect on primary school completion reported
in Table 2. The latter suggests that a disproportionate share of the students who enrolled
in primary school as a result of the reform eventually dropped out before the end of the
cycle, possibly because of low learning productivity. On the whole, the results presented
in sections 4.1 and 4.2 provide suggestive evidence that the increase in primary school
enrolment induced by the reform in Malawi did not boost skill accumulation as much as
in the other countries.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper finds that the elimination of primary school fees led to an increase in female
schooling and employment in four sub-Saharan African countries. This is also associated
with a drop in fertility. On the whole, these results suggest that expanding access to
education enables women from the poorest families to engage in economic activities that
require basic skills, such as self-employment opportunities in retail and services. This also
raises the value of women’s time, inciting them to reduce the number of children they give
birth to. A key takeaway is thus that fee elimination can help remove some of the barriers
to transitioning from unpaid family work (or being out of the workforce) to paid work
outside of non-agriculture.
The findings also reveal substantial heterogeneity in the magnitude and direction of the
effects of the reform on educational attainment and employment outcomes across the four
countries. The country for which the effects are most modest (both in terms of educational
attainment and employment outcomes) is Malawi, where the rate of primary school com-
pletion was lowest and the pupil-teacher ratio was substantially higher than in the other
countries prior to the reform. In other words, the country furthest away from achieving
universal primary education prior to FPE also appears to have achieved the smallest gains
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from school fee elimination. Suggestive evidence points to low levels of learning productiv-
ity ex-ante, that might have deteriorated further with the large enrolment surge induced
by the reform, as the possible culprit for these modest effects. In contrast, the country
found to have experienced the largest impacts of primary school fee abolition, Ghana, was
starting from a much higher primary school completion rate ex-ante (52% of women vs.
24% in Malawi) and seems to have minimised adverse quality effects from the enrolment
surge, at least as suggested by the evolution of pupil-teacher ratios and the literacy-years
of schooling relationship.
The main limitation of this study is that it follows a purely reduced form approach. The
channels of impact I put forth in the interpretation of the results thus remain suggestive,
and alternative mechanisms cannot be ruled out. First, the reform could also have affected
occupational outcomes through an income effect, if its impact on employment is driven
by families who would have been willing to pay tuition fees for sending their children
to school and were thus able to reallocate the fees towards other productive investments
that could influence their children’s occupations. Second, assuming the effect of FPE on
employment materialised solely through increased schooling, we should keep in mind that
education can affect labor market outcomes through other channels than cognitive skill
accumulation. These include signaling of ability (Spence (1973)), the non-cognitive effects
of schooling (Duckworth and Gross (2014)), or improved marriage prospects (Ashraf et al.
(2020)). Delving into the underlying factors responsible for the differences in occupational
choice effects associated with FPE across these four countries may constitute a fruitful
avenue for future research.
Finally, it is important to note that, even in Ghana, the education boost is not accom-
panied by any detectable change in the share of salaried workers. Indeed, the substantial
increase in female employment associated with the reform in this country is largely con-
centrated in self-employed retail activities. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to
determine whether this type of job creation can generate labor market amplification effects
in the longer run, this finding raises a new set of questions. Do there exist salaried jobs that
women could aspire to but for which the skill requirements are beyond those acquired at
the primary level? Or, does the absence of a dynamic modern sector result in a lack of de-
mand for salaried workers in Ghana? Little is known about whether the type of structural
change undergone by many sub-Saharan African countries includes the sectoral shift from
“brawn-based” industries to services that has been shown to boost female employment
in other settings (Heath and Jayachandran (2018); Ngai and Petrongolo (2017)).6 The
absence of such demand-side factors may be limiting the labor market impacts of the FPE
6See Osei and Jedwab (2013) for a case study of Ghana’s structural transformation process. They
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reform in the four countries studied in this paper. The nature of the relationship between
structural change and female education in sub-Saharan African economies remains poorly
understood, thus opening doors for future research.
conclude that “structural change remains different in Ghana — it has occurred without a green revolution,
an industrial revolution, or a service revolution of the types seen in Asia.”
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Appendix to Chapter 2.
Figure A.1: Share of Afrobarometer 2002-2003 survey respondents willing to pay tuition
fees for quality schooling
This graph plots the share of survey respondents who agree with A and B respectively in response
to the question: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? A: It is better to
have free schooling for our children, even if the quality of education is low. B: It is better to raise
educational standards, even if we have to pay school fees.
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Chapter 3
Chat Over Coffee? Technology
Diffusion Through Social and
Geographic Networks in Rwanda
3.1 Introduction
Do agricultural technologies diffuse through information networks? This question has been
the subject of much research in development economics, motivated by the growing gap in
agricultural productivity between developed and developing countries – and in particular
sub-Saharan Africa – over the past half-century (e.g. World Bank (2007)). Given the
critical importance of agriculture to low-income economies, the successful adoption of yield-
enhancing technologies has the potential to substantially reduce global poverty. In this
paper, we ask whether social learning can help alleviate information frictions that inhibit
the diffusion of best agronomic practices.
Our study employs an RCT to study this question, in partnership with a leading NGO
in Rwanda that provides agronomy training to coffee farmers to help them improve their
yields. Our experiment applies an oversubscription design to a sample of approximately
1,600 farmers who applied to the training program, across all 27 villages in a given admin-
istrative unit (a sector).1 Half of the applicants were randomly selected for the trainings,
while the other half received no training and serves as our control group. Selected farmers
received monthly instruction modules for the first year, followed by five refresher modules
over the next year. These modules covered nutrition, pest and disease management, weed
management, mulching, rejuvenation and pruning, shade, soil and water conservation, and
1Sector is the third level of administration in Rwanda, so corresponds to a sub-district.
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record keeping. Farmers were grouped for trainings and picked a lead farmer whose plot
was used for demonstrations of the agricultural practices. We also randomly varied treat-
ment concentration at the village level: in a third of villages, 25% of farmers who signed
up were treated, in another third, 50% and in the final third, 75%.
We collected data on a wide range of indicators to measure the impacts of the trainings
on the farmers’ knowledge and adoption of the agricultural practices, as well as their yields.
In total, we collected ten rounds of survey data, in addition to a census. We also collected
GPS data on these plots and distributed scales and calendars to farmers so they could weigh
and record their harvests. To allay concerns surrounding error in self-reported adoption,
we also conducted audits of five trees on each coffee plot. To measure the diffusion of the
effects to farmers’ social connections, we conducted 3 rounds of social networks surveying,
listing the friends and agricultural contacts of household heads and spouses. We use this
data to construct complete social network maps of all the coffee-growing households in the
sector, amounting to over 5,000 households across 29 villages. This also allows us to track
any changes in the map of social ties over the duration of the program. Finally, we use
the GPS data to construct two measures of neighbours: people farmers live close to and
people who have coffee plots next to their coffee plots.
We harness this data to build a range of outcomes. From the household surveys, we
construct an index of knowledge and an index of (self-reported) adoption of improved
agricultural practices. We also measure use of chemical fertilizer, compost, labor inputs,
and coffee harvests (monthly and seasonal). Here, we complemented the surveys with
yield-recording calendars. From the audit data, we construct an index of adoption of
improved agricultural practices, which encompasses mulching, weeding, pruning and pest
management. We also conduct an index of leaf health, which includes yellowing, curling
and rusting of leaves, and an index of all outcomes.
We find that the training program had significant effects on knowledge and self-reported
adoption of the agronomic practices: the treatment led to a 0.32 standard deviation increase
in the knowledge index and a 0.14 standard deviation increase in the adoption index. The
effects we detect in the tree audits data are of more modest magnitude. The “main audits”
index is 0.043 standard deviations higher in the treatment group than in the control group,
suggesting that the program had some effect on how well and how much the farmers applied
this subset of practices (weeding, mulching and smoothing/banding the tree to control
white borer). We also find suggestive evidence that the trees of treatment farmers are
better nourished, as the audits data reveal a decrease in the prevalence of leaf defects.
Importantly, the increase in adoption that we observe in the treatment group had an
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impact on yields, which are about 3% higher in the treatment group than in the control
group. In terms of input use, the program led to a 1.9 percentage point increase in the
share of farmers using chemical fertilizer (NPK), corresponding to a 24% increase relative
to the control group. The treatment also induced farmers to allocate more labor inputs to
their coffee plots: we find a 5.5% increase in the number of household labor days per tree
and a 22% increase in the number of paid labor days per tree.
Our analysis of the diffusion of treatment effects through farmers’ social and geographic
networks focuses on two types of networks: baseline friends and neighbors. The identifi-
cation strategy exploits the exogenous variation caused by the random allocation of the
program in the number of treatment friends (treatment neighbors), conditional on the total
number of friends (neighbors) in the sample. We do not find any evidence of spillovers
to the control group, as adoption rates of control group farmers are unaffected by their
number of treatment friends. Our results also suggest that there is no diffusion of the
program’s effects through geographic networks (household and plot neighbors).
We estimate some diffusion of effects through the treatment group, observed primarily
on leaf health outcomes. Conditional on their total number of friends in the sample,
having an additional friend in the treatment group reduces the leaf defects index by 0.036
standard deviations - a sign of better tree nutrition. To investigate the mechanisms driving
this effect, we test whether diffusion effects are stronger for friends who attended trainings
together. Our results confirm this hypothesis. Conditional on their total number of friends
in the sample and the number of farmers in their training group, we find that the effect of
having one more pre-existing friend in their training group is associated with a reduction
in treatment farmers’ leaf defects index by 0.057 standard deviations. This estimate is
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that information related to tree health acquired in
the trainings disseminated among treatment farmers who attended the trainings together,
leading to a reinforcement of treatment effects.
Another explanation for why the diffusion of effects through farmers’ baseline networks
appears relatively weak on all but the leaf health channel is that friendship networks
may have changed as a result of the program. We test this hypothesis in our final piece
of analysis, by examining the impact of the training groups on farmers’ reported social
network links to other farmers with whom they discuss coffee. We find clear evidence
that the training program causes a re-sorting of social networks and an increase in links
with others who have learned from the trainings. These effects may be partly due to time
spent together at trainings, but control group households also increase links to trained
individuals in their villages.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the setting and the program.
Section 3 presents the experimental design and describes the data collection. Section 4
discusses our results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Background and Program Description
3.2.1 Context: Rural Rwanda
Coffee is a major export crop for Rwanda and contributes about US$62 million in export
earnings per year, almost 5 percent of the country’s goods and services exports (NISR
(2019)). In the decade leading up to the year of our experiment (2000-2009), Rwanda’s
productivity was estimated to be 6447 hectograms of green coffee harvest per hectare of
harvested area, ranking it as 38th out of 75 coffee-producing countries in the world (FAO
2019).
Production is dominated by 500,000 smallholder coffee producers (OCIR-Café (2008)).
In Rwanda - the most densely populated country in sub-Saharan Africa - land parcels are
extremely small and most farm households live off subsistence agriculture, and therefore
give priority to food crops. Higher coffee yields could make coffee a more attractive crop
choice and thus help small-scale farmers shift out of subsistence farming into more profitable
activities.
3.2.2 TechnoServe’s Agronomy Training Program
The context for our study is a large agronomy training program run for coffee farmers
in rural Rwanda, aimed at improving the health of small scale farmers’ coffee trees and
ultimately their coffee yields. TechnoServe (henceforth TNS), an agri-business NGO, con-
ducted agricultural business and technology trainings in several coffee growing regions in
Rwanda and other East African countries between 2010 and 2015. This study focuses on
the agronomy program in one sector (an administrative unit) in Southern Rwanda, called
Nyarubaka. Rwanda has ideal growing conditions for coffee and it is the main export crop,
but the country’s agronomic practices and processing are in dire need of improvement. Be-
tween February 2010 and October 2011, TechnoServe ran an agronomy training program
for coffee farmers in Nyarubaka to improve coffee yields in the area.
The training covered several best practices in coffee growing: tree rejuvenation and
pruning; fertilizer use; pest, disease and weed management; mulching; soil and water
conservation; optimal shade; and record keeping. Appendix 1 provides a more detailed
description of the eight main sets of practices that were covered under this training program
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and what the expected impacts of each were. The training sessions took place once a
month for eleven months in the first year of the program (starting in February 2010). TNS
conducted an additional five review training sessions after these sessions were over, with the
last review session being held in October 2011. The trainings were conducted with groups
of approximately thirty farmers and took place on the plot of a designated "focal farmer".
The focal farmers were chosen partly because of the accessibility of their coffee plot but
were also meant to be respected members of the local community, had an enthusiasm for
learning and were ideally not a committee member of the coffee cooperative.
The training itself was conducted by a TNS Farmer Trainer, each of whom supported
approximately 10 of these focal farmer groups. These farmer trainers received monthly
training from the TNS agronomist for each agronomy module, together with lesson plans
and activities. They delivered the training to each group in the field of the focal farmer,
with each module being conducted on a plot of approximately forty trees which then would
become the demonstration plot, and with all practical work done by the farmers in the
training group. A total of four farmer trainers covered the TNS Nyarubaka program.
Nyarubaka sector comprises 29 villages, all of which were included in the study. Once
TNS decided to train in Nyarubaka, they advertized the program with fliers. Advertise-
ments for the agronomy training were translated into the national language and placed at
the village level in administration offices, schools and churches. The farmer trainers were
then assigned to visit the villages over a week to register the interested farmers, visiting
each village at least twice. During registration, the farmer trainers collected the farmers’
unique Rwandan identity number (along with some limited additional information) to en-
sure uniqueness of the registered farmers. Farmers who did not have coffee farms were
not allowed to register for the program and only one person per household was allowed to
register. In total, 1594 farmers registered as being interested in the program. Although
the program was advertized in all the 29 villages in Nyarubaka, only farmers from 27 of
the 29 villages registered to join the program. So, the treatment farmers are only in 27 of
the 29 villages, though farmers in all 29 villages were surveyed, as we describe below.
3.3 Experimental Design and Data
3.3.1 Experimental Design
To understand the diffusion of coffee practices through social networks, we worked with
TNS to design a field experiment around their Nyarubaka training program. The 1594
farmers who registered for the program were randomized into a treatment and a control
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group. Of the 1594, 855 farmers were assigned to the treatment group to receive the
agronomy training. The remaining 739 farmers were assigned to the control group and
received no training at any point. In addition to this basic farmer level randomization,
we randomized the 27 villages that had farmers that registered to be part of the training
into three different levels of treatment concentration: in a third of villages, 25% of the
registered farmers were treated, in a second third of villages, 50% of the registered farmers
were treated, and in the final third of villages, 75% of the registered farmers were treated.
This explains why the number of treated and control farmers is not exactly the same.
Farmers were assigned to training groups in their village or in the village nearest to
their location if the number of local farmers assigned to treatment was less than the
minimum size for a training group. In larger villages where the total number of farmers
assigned to treatment exceeded the optimal group size for training purposes according to
TNS, treatment farmers were split into two or three groups for training, based mainly
on geographical convenience. For practical purposes, this split was not randomized. Once
assigned to a training group, farmers were expected to remain in the same group throughout
the duration of the program.
During the first year of trainings, farmers in the training villages attended an average
of 8 out of the 11 meetings (an attendance rate of about 73 percent). Attendance tended
to be higher in the villages with higher proportions of farmers who were offered training:
households in high-density training villages attended an average of 8.2 out of 11 meetings,
whereas households in low density training villages attended around 7.2. This suggests
that farmers were more motivated to attend trainings when more of their neighbors were
also invited to attend.
3.3.2 Data
To fully capture the diffusion of coffee practices from the training program, we designed
extensive data collection activities over the course of almost three years. In total, we
collected ten rounds of survey data, in addition to a census. As we describe in detail,
different modules of questions were asked in different rounds of the survey and some rounds
of the survey included not just treatment and control households, but also additional coffee
farmers in Nyarubaka sector. In addition to survey data, as we describe below, we audited
coffee fields, collected GPS data on these fields, and distributed scales and calendars to
some farmers so they could weigh and record their harvests. We describe each of these
data collection activities in detail.
103
Survey Data
From December 2009 through October 2012, we conducted ten rounds of surveys. These
surveys focused on the 1,594 farmers who are part of the field experiment: the RCT-sample
farmers. However, given the social networks focus of the study, we also wanted to map the
full social networks of the RCT-sample farmers. Therefore, alongside the baseline survey
in December 2009, we also conducted a full census of the 5,198 farming households in all 29
villages of the Nyarubaka sector, including many who had not volunteered for the study.
Out of these, we focused on the 57% who had grown/harvested coffee in the year prior
to the census, given the training program was targeted on coffee alone and it takes five
years for coffee trees to grow once they have been planted. This meant that there were
an additional 1,327 coffee farmers in Nyarubaka who did not register for the agronomy
training program. Throughout, we refer to these farmers as the non-RCT-sample farmers,
implying they grow coffee and live in the same sector as the RCT-sample farmers but are
neither treatment nor control farmers for the agronomy program.
The data collection was split into modules that covered different aspects of the house-
hold’s behavior. The modules covered household demographics, detailed plot level data
for coffee as well as all other crops (including harvests, sales, labor and other inputs),
coffee plot performance, coffee farming activities and practices, a consumption module,
household finance and social networks for the household head and the spouse. In the social
networks module, we asked both the household head and spouse who their friends were
(with no limit on the number that could be listed). In addition, we asked which of these
friends grew coffee and which they spoke to about coffee. Throughout the paper, we define
friends as being “coffee friends", the friends that respondents in the sample report talking
to about coffee.
Not every round of data collection covered the same modules and not every module
in a given round covered all farmers. We collected fewer rounds of data for the farmers
in the non-RCT-sample. Appendix 3 shows the schedule of which modules were collected
in which rounds of data collection separately for the farmers in the RCT-sample and for
those in the non-RCT-sample, as well as the timing of each survey wave. The first nine
rounds of surveys took place every 2-3 months over the course of the program (recall that
the training was run monthly between February 2010 and October 2011), and the tenth
and final round took place in September-October 2012.
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Audit Data
In addition to the survey data, we also audited the coffee plots. We were concerned that
asking farmers several times about their adoption patterns may result in them erroneously
reporting positive adoption simply because they were asked about it a few times. For the
audits, the TNS agronomist trained our field staff to recognize a set of agronomy practices.
The field staff were then given instructions on how to inspect coffee plots and trees.2
Some variables were collected at the household level, some at the plot level (for each
coffee plot) and others at the tree level (for five trees on each coffee plot). Data on two
practices were collected at the household level that were also observed by the field staff:
whether the household kept record books and whether the household has a compost heap.
The field staff collected data on three practices at the plot level: whether the farmer had
used any methods to control for soil erosion (such as using stabilizing grasses, water traps,
etc.), whether there were any shade tress on the plot, and whether the farmer had grown
other crops among the coffee. Finally, data on twelve practices were collected for each
of five trees that were observed on each coffee plot: whether the tree had any antestia
(an insect), how many leaves were yellowing, how many leaves were curling, use of mulch,
evidence of weeding, evidence of rejuvenation, evidence of pruning, evidence of integrated
pest management, whether the tree had any berry borers (an insect), evidence of damage
from white borers, evidence of scales or mealy bugs or mould, and signs of leaf rust.
Weigh Scale Data
Starting in March 2011, we distributed weigh scales to all the farmers in the RCT-sample
for them to keep accurate counts of their coffee harvests. The bulk of the coffee harvest
usually arrives in May and June. Starting in March 2011 and through June 2012, every
month we distributed a yield calendar to the farmers in the RCT-sample for them to record
daily harvests for that month. An example of a yield calendar is shown in Appendix 4.
The farmers were given instructions on how to use the weigh scale and how to record their
coffee harvests on the calendars. At the end of every month, we collected up the calendars
and distributed new ones for the following month.
3.4 Results
In this section, we describe the results. First, we show randomization balance along a
number of baseline characteristics. We then describe the direct treatment effects of the
2More details on this are provided in the Appendix.
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agronomy program for the farmers in the RCT-sample. Next, we show results on diffusion
of the practices among both the treatment and control farmers. Finally, we examine
whether diffusion is stronger among treatment friends who also attend trainings together.
3.4.1 Baseline Checks
We use the baseline data for the farmers in the RCT-sample to check for randomization
balance. For a number of different baseline outcomes, we report results from the following
specification in Table 1:
yij = α+ βTreatij + γj + εij (3.1)
where yij is the outcome for household i in village j, Treatij is a dummy variable for
whether the household was allocated to the agronomy training program; γj are a set of
village fixed effects.
As can be seen from Table 1, we find balance between treatment and control groups
across a wide variety of baseline outcomes. The p-value on the joint F-test for these
outcomes is 0.2638.
3.4.2 Agronomy Training Program Treatment Effects
Before we can study diffusion, we first need to confirm that the agronomy training program
itself had effects, both on the knowledge and adoption of practices as well as on real
outcomes. Therefore, we first report on the treatment effects of the program, obtained by
running specification (3.1) on different outcomes. For outcomes related to the practices,
we create the following indices:3
1. Knowledge: this index is the mean of fifteen standardized measures of what the
farmer knows. It includes whether the farmer knows each of the ten methods used to
control insects, pests and other diseases and how they should be used and whether
the farmer knows each of five different fertilizers that should be used on coffee.
2. Adoption: this index is the mean of nine standardized measures of which prac-
tices the farmer adopts. Importantly, these are collected using survey questions,
and therefore measure self-reported adoption, as opposed to observed adoption. It
includes whether the farmer adopted each of eight methods used to control insects,
pests and other diseases, and whether the farmers kept a compost heap.
3All these outcomes are standardized with respect to the mean and variance of the outcome in the
control group.
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3. All audits: this index is the mean of nine standardized measures of what the farmer
adopts as per the observed tree audits. This index includes two measures of whether
the farmer uses integrated pest management (whether old and dry berries are re-
moved, whether the bark is smoothed or banded to control white borer), whether the
farmer used mulch, whether the tree was weeded, whether there are signs of rejuve-
nation, and four measures of pruning (removal of dead branches, removal of branches
touching the ground, removal of crossing branches, removal of unwanted suckers).
4. Main audits: this index is the mean of three standardized measures of what the
farmer adopts as per the observed tree audits. We limit this to whether the tree has
been mulched, whether it has been weeded and whether the bark has been smoothed
or banded. We used these three measures for the main audits, at the recommendation
of the agronomist at TNS who reported these were the most important practices (or
practices with the largest effects on tree health).
5. Leaf defects: this index is the mean of three standardized measures of leaf health
from the tree audits. It includes: whether there are signs of the leaves yellowing,
whether the leaves are curling and whether there are signs of the leaves rusting. A
decrease in any of these measures would indicate an improvement in tree nutrition.
Table 2 reports treatment effects of the training program on measures of knowledge and
adoption of the agronomic practices, and on yields. The first two columns show the impact
of the program on our indices of knowledge (column 1) and adoption (column 2) of the
practices. The treatment effects on these outcomes are large and statistically significant:
the treatment leads to a 0.32 standard deviation increase in the knowledge index and a
0.14 standard deviation increase in the adoption index. This suggests that the treated
farmers gained additional knowledge about coffee agronomy thanks to the program, and
also report putting this new knowledge into practice.
The tree audits data are an important complement to the self-reports data, as they
allow us to test whether the treatment group’s higher reported adoption translates into
noticeably healthier-looking trees. Treatment effects on these outcomes are reported in
columns 3-5 of Table 2. Column 3 shows that the program did not have any effect on the
first index of tree audit outcomes (described in the previous sub-section). However, the
“main audits" index is 0.043 standard deviations higher in the treatment group than in the
control group, suggesting that the program had some effect on how well and how much the
farmers applied this subset of practices (weeding, mulching and smoothing/banding the
tree to control white borer).
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The program may also have decreased the incidence of leaf defects, as the index of
probabilities that yellow, curling or rusting leaves are observed upon inspection is 0.029
standard deviations lower in the treatment than in the control group. While this estimate
is not statistically significant (the p-value is 0.175), this could indicate that treatment
farmers’ trees are better nourished than those of the control group as a result of the
program. Although this interpretation should be treated with caution given the imprecision
of the estimate, it would certainly be consistent with the result in column 6, which shows
the productivity impacts of the agronomy trainings: the treatment group’s yields are 2.9%
higher in the treatment group than in the control - an estimate significant at the 5% level.
In Table 3, we turn to the effects of the program on farmers’ use of inputs. Columns
1 and 2 report effects on the use of two types of fertilizer, compost and chemical fertilizer
(NPK).4 While the coefficient estimates are positive for both outcomes, only the effect
on NPK is statistically significant. The probability of a farmer reporting that they have
applied NPK on at least one of their plots is 1.9 percentage points higher among the
treatment farmers, which, given the low use of chemical fertilizer in the RCT-sample prior
to the intervention, represents a 24% increase relative to the control group. Compost
use is only modestly more frequent in the treatment group, by 1.4 percentage points - an
increase of just over 2% relative to the control group - and this estimate is not statistically
significant. This suggests that the treatment did not shift compost use on the average
household in this sample - where the fraction of farmers who reported using compost was
already 72.5% at baseline (Table 1).
The treatment also induced treated farmers to spend more time working on their coffee
plots, as the number of household labor days per tree is 0.012 higher among treatment
farms, a 5.5% increase relative to the control group. Treatment farmers also report a
higher number of paid labor days per tree: treated farmers hired an additional 0.002 days
of paid labor per tree, corresponding to a 22% increase relative to the control group.
3.4.3 Diffusion of Treatment Effects
We now turn to the diffusion of treatment effects through treated farmers’ social and
geographic networks. Our analysis focuses on two types of networks: baseline friends and
neighbors. We focus on household neighbors in this section, because the diffusion through
plot neighbors is very similar (i.e. there is no diffusion).5 The identification strategy
4These are the two fertilizers that the agronomy program focuses on - other types of fertilizer not being
recommended for most common soil types in Rwanda.
5These results are in the Appendix.
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exploits the exogenous variation in the number of treatment friends, conditional on the
total number of sample friends, provided by the random allocation of the program.
Diffusion among Treatment and Control Groups
The top two panels of Table 4 (panels A and B) report the results from the following
specification, which we run separately on the treatment and control groups:
yij = α+ βNumTreatFriendsij + δNumFriendsij + γj + εij (3.2)
where yij is the outcome for household i in village j, NumTreatFriendsij is the number
of treatment friends of household i, and NumFriendsij is their total number of sample
friends.
The bottom panels of Table 4 (panels C and D) report the results from the specification:
yij = α+ βNumTreatNeighborsij + δNumNeighborsij + γj + εij (3.3)
whereNumTreatNeighborsij is the number of neighbors of household i who were allocated
to the treatment group and NumNeighborsij is household i’s total number of sample
neighbors.
The estimates in columns 1 and 2 report the diffusion effect of treatment friends (in
panels A and B) or treatment neighbors (in panels C and D) on the knowledge and self-
reported adoption of RCT-sample farmers. The coefficients in column 1 are estimates of
the average effect of having an additional friend or neighbor in the treatment group on the
knowledge index of treatment (in panels A and C) or control (in panels B and D) farmers.
Taken together, the four estimates in column 1 point to an absence of diffusion of knowledge
about the practices on either the treatment or the control group, as these estimates are
all close to zero and statistically insignificant. The results in column 2 are similar for all
sections of the table. The estimate in panel C, for example, indicates that having one
more neighbor who is in the treatment group increases treatment farmers’ adoption index
by 0.021 standard deviations.
It is important to remember here that the knowledge index measures only the awareness
that the agronomic practices should be applied. Likewise, the self-reported adoption index
only measures whether the farmer reports having applied them - not how well or how often.
Therefore, the fact that no diffusion is observed on farmers’ self-reported knowledge and
adoption of the practices overall does not mean that treated farmers do not discuss the
content of the trainings with other farmers in the sample. This result simply indicates
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that, if information is shared, it is more likely to be about how (or how often) practices
should be applied in order for them to be most effective. The coefficient in the top row
of column 1 indicates that, holding constant one’s total number of friends, having an
additional friend in the treatment decreases (albeit insignificantly) the average treatment
farmer’s knowledge index by 0.004 standard deviations.
We now turn to the indices constructed using tree audits data, for which estimates of
diffusion effects are reported in columns 3-5. Taken together, the results in the bottom
three panels (B, C, and D) of Table 4 for columns 3-5 do not provide evidence of any
diffusion effects on the control group - from treated friends or neighbours - or on the
treatment group from treated neighbors. On the other hand, panel A points to some
diffusion of effects through the treatment group. This diffusion is observed primarily on
the leaf defects outcome: the first row of column 5 indicates that having an additional
friend in the treatment group reduces the leaf defects index by 0.036 standard deviations
for an average farmer’s trees in the treatment group, conditional on their total number of
friends in the RCT-sample. In other words, having more friends in the treatment group
seems to improve the health of treatment farmers’ leaves - a sign of better tree nutrition.
We interpret this as diffusion of information related to tree health taught in the trainings
among treatment farmers, leading to reinforcement of the treatment effect.
The significantly negative coefficients in columns 3 and 4 are surprising. In column 3,
for example, the coefficient reported in panel A suggests that each additional treatment
friend is associated with a decrease of 0.019 standard deviations in treatment farmers’
index of tree audit outcomes (comprised of nine standardized measures of tree outcomes)
on average. In panel B, the estimate reported in column 3 indicates that, for an average
farmer in the control group, having one more friend in the treatment group decreases this
index by 0.021 standard deviations. Column 3 of panel D states that having one more
neighbor who is in the treatment group decrease control farmers’ adoption index by 0.020
standard deviations, conditional on their total number of sample neighbors.
Diffusion on the Treatment Group by Program Participation
To investigate mechanisms behind the diffusion of leaf health improvements among treat-
ment farmers, we test whether diffusion effects are stronger for friends who attended train-
ings together. To this end, we run one more specification on the treatment group:
yij = α+ β1TFriendsSameGrpij + β2TFriendsOtherGrpij
+δNumFriendsij + θGroupSizeij + γj + εij
(3.4)
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where yij is the outcome for household i in village j, TFriendsSameGrpij is the number
of treatment friends of household i who were part of the same training group as household i
whereas TFriendsOtherGrpij denotes their number of treatment friends who were part of
a different training group. NumFriendsij is household i’s total number of sample friends,
and GroupSizeij is the number of treatment farmers in household i’s training group.
The results of specification (3.4) are reported in Table 5. The first two columns report
effects on our two indices of tree audit outcomes, All Audits and Main Audits, on which
we found no evidence of any diffusion in Table 4. Here again, the coefficient estimate on
the number of treatment friends (both those who the household trained with and those
who were part of a different training group) is negative and insignificant (except for row 2
of column 1, which is significant at the 5% level).
Columns 3 and 4, however, provide evidence consistent with a channel of reinforcement
of treatment effects through friends who attend the same trainings. The top row of column
3 shows that, conditional on their total number of friends in the RCT-sample and the
number of farmers in their training group, the effect of having one more treatment friend
in their training group is associated with a reduction in treatment farmers’ leaf defects index
by 0.057 standard deviations. This estimate is significant at the 1% level. In the top row of
column 4, we also see a positive diffusion effect on yields - albeit statistically insignificant -
with each additional treatment friend that they trained with increasing treatment farmers’
yields by 0.9% on average. In contrast, the effect on these two outcomes from an additional
treatment friend who attends a different training group, is a decrease in 0.009 standard
deviations in the leaf defects index and a 1% decrease in yields respectively, and both are
insignificant.
Finally, columns 5 and 6 report estimates on the effects of training with other treatment
friends on fertilizer use. These do not lend support to a reinforcement of treatment effects
on compost or NPK use driven by farmers attending the same trainings as their friends,
as neither of the coefficient estimates in the top two rows are statistically significantly
different from zero.
Taken together, the results in Tables 5 suggest that any diffusion of treatment effects
through the treatment group is concentrated around leaf health improvements, and this is
driven by treatment friends who attend the same trainings. The presence of leaf defects
is an important indicator of tree nutrition. The result on yields suggests that this may
result in productivity improvements as well, although this estimate is too imprecise to lend
confidence to this interpretation.
Since the effects on fertilizer use are similar across friends within and outside farmers’
111
training groups, we cannot interpret these results as simply suggesting that farmers who
attend trainings together reinforce each other’s learning about the importance of using fer-
tilizer. However, they could be helping each other understand and retain the most effective
ways of applying the practices (e.g. with the right quantities of compost). Another ex-
planation for why diffusion of effects through farmers’ baseline networks appears relatively
weak on all but the leaf health channel is that friendship networks changed as a result of
the program. We investigate this hypothesis in the next section.
3.4.4 Program Effects on Social Networks
The group training structure is a central component of the Technoserve program. Group
trainings reduce the cost of implementation, and allow farmers to interact during the
demonstrations, thus learning from each other and creating relationships. In this section
we examine the impact of the training groups on farmers’ reported social network links to
other farmers with whom they discuss coffee. To carry out this analysis we first transform
the data to the household-by-training group level. Each household corresponds to 39 ob-
servations of the dependent variable: 38 containing the number of friends the respondent
names in each training group, plus 1 "pseudo-group" for friends not treated (whether as-
signed to control, or outside the sample). To account for fixed differences in these training
groups both within and across villages, all regressions include fixed effects at the village-
by-training group level as well as the household level. This estimation strategy allows
us to focus on the interactions between group-level characteristics and household treat-
ment status. The group level-characteristics we examine are whether the group consists of
trained households (i.e., all groups except the untrained pseudo-group), whether the group
is organized in the same village as the respondent, and whether the group is the same that
was attended by the respondent’s household. Note that each of these categories is nested:
all groups in the village were trained, and (almost) all groups attended by the respondents
were in the same village where the respondent lived.
Table 6 reports the results. The first column shows the effect of the treatment on
the number of friends reported in any training group, including those not personally at-
tended by the household and perhaps in other villages. Rows 1 confirms that there was
no significant difference between treatment and control households’ numbers of treated or
untreated friends at baseline, and row 4 shows that treated households had no change in
their number of untreated friends after the program. Row 5 shows a marginally significant
increase of 0.129 friends in any training groups for control households after the program,
and row 8 shows that this effect was not significantly larger for treated households. These
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changes appear to be a re-allocation of social network links rather than a net increase in
friends: the reported number of links with untreated households decreases (row 10) by
almost exactly the same amount as treated household friendships increase (row 4).
Column 2 refines the analysis to focus on the change in treated friends who were trained
in the respondent household’s own village. Row 2 shows that, at baseline, there was no
difference between treatment and control households on this outcome. Row 6 shows that
control households increase their average number of friends in treatment groups in their own
village by 0.064 above and beyond the increase of 0.127 in friends from treatment groups
in any village. The sum of these coefficients is significant at the .02% level. Finally, row 8
shows a highly significant additional increase in the number of friends from within-village
treated groups if the respondent household is itself treated. Indeed, the total increase in
within-village treated friends is more than twice as large as the increase in outside-village
treated friends for treated households.
Finally, column 3 displays results on the number of friends from each treated house-
hold’s own training group. This evidence is qualitatively different from that presented in
the first 2 columns for several reasons. First, as rows 2-3 make clear, assignment to specific
training groups within a village was not randomized. Thus at baseline treated households
had more friends in their own training groups (row 3) and fewer in other training groups
within the same village (row 2). This is likely because households were sorted into training
groups based on proximity. Second, we can only examine the effects on the number of
friends in the household’s own training group within the sample of trained households.
This is because the control households never had the opportunity to select into a training
group. For this reason there is no “In same training grp.×Post” coefficient displayed in
column 3. These caveats aside, the coefficients in rows 8-9 of column 3 tell a clear story
of the program’s impact on the social network links of treated households. Relative to
the controls, trained households are marginally less likely to form friendships with treated
individuals in different training groups in their own villages (-0.02 in row 8, though this is
not significant). However, compared to the same trained households prior to the program,
they significantly increase the number of social network contacts with households who at-
tended the same training group (row 9). The coefficient of 0.278 is by far the largest and
seems to be entirely driving the differential effect of the program on the social networks of
its beneficiaries. However, because this outcome is not defined for the control group, this
parameter is identified only by changes over time within the treatment group.
Regardless of the specific outcome, it is clear that the training program causes a re-
sorting of social network and an increase in links with others who have learned from the
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trainings. These effects may be partly due to time spent together at trainings, but as we
see in rows 4 and 5, control group households also increase links to trained individuals in
their villages.
3.5 Conclusions
This paper asks whether knowledge about best agronomic practices acquired through train-
ing programs can spread through social networks. We find limited evidence of this in our
RCT in Rwanda. The results suggest that there were no spillovers of the program on the
adoption rates of control group farmers, nor do we find any evidence of dissemination of
the effects through the farmers’ geographic networks (neighbors).
Any diffusion of treatment effects through the treatment group is concentrated around
leaf health improvements. We find that this effect is driven by farmers with existing social
connections at baseline, with whom they attended the trainings. This is detected in the
form of reductions in leaf defects in the tree audits, which means the trees are receiving
better nutrition. Since we do not find evidence of diffusion in the form of increased fertilizer
use, this suggests that farmers training together with friends help each other learn how best
to implement agronomic practices surrounding tree nutrition, leading to a reinforcement
of treatment effects.
Our findings contribute to the growing body of evidence on both the role of information
frictions and the complexities of social learning in agriculture. Recent studies suggest
that farmers can lack information on how to best apply even familiar technologies, a
phenomenon that has been attributed to poor access to extension in remote areas as well
as inattention to parts of farming production functions (Cole and Fernando (2012); Hanna
et al. (2014)). From this stems a key policy need to understand the determinants of social
learning. If technology use spreads quickly through farmers’ networks, then extension
programs can hope to alleviate information frictions at scale by targeting a few well-
connected farmers who can be expected to spread the information to others. However,
if there is little diffusion, then programs may be better off training many farmers in a
concentrated geographic area to maximize impact.
An emerging trend in the literature is that randomized studies tend to find less diffu-
sion of agricultural technologies than non-randomized studies. In this respect, our results
resonate with those of other RCTs that find limited evidence of social learning in the con-
text of extension services (e.g. Kondylis et al. (2017)) or about new seed varities (e.g.
Tjernström (2017)). Part of the explanation for the overall absence of diffusion we find
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may reflect the fact that the identity of recipients can be of critical importance to knowl-
edge dissemination (BenYishay et al. (2015); Beaman et al. (2020)). Recent evidence
also points to the potential benefits of harnessing ICTs to provide technological solutions
to social learning frictions (Cole and Fernando (2012); Aker and Ksoll (2016); Tjernström
et al. (2020)).
Finally, our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, one of the first to study how
social ties evolve in response to a randomly allocated extension program. Other studies
of endogenous network changes include Banerjee et al. (2018), who find that microfinance
decreases the number of links of individuals exposed to microfinance. In our setting, we find
that the training program is associated with an increase in links among treatment farmers
who attended trainings together as well between control group households and trained
individuals in their villages. The fact that extension services can change a community’s
social structure is important for the effective design of programs hoping to leverage pre-
existing networks as a key vector of technology diffusion in agriculture.
Perhaps the reason that much of the RCT-based research on diffusion through social
networks has found limited results is that baseline social networks are a noisy and incom-
plete measure of post-treatment social connections. As we demonstrate in our analysis of
dynamic social networks, the treatment itself creates connections between individuals. If it
is these new connections that matter most for information dissemination, then an analysis
using baseline links may conclude there is no social learning while in fact social learning is
occurring but via a different set of links. This perspective suggests that future interven-
tions might be designed to leverage this mechanism by creating a new social network most
conducive to learning and rapid adoption.
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Table 3.1: Baseline Checks
Mean Coefficient Std Error P-value
Yield, Coffee Kg Per Tree 1.262 .08 .079 .316
Total Trees 264.801 15.472 14.719 .293
Fraction Unproductive Trees .312 -.012 .019 .548
Zero Productive Trees .116 -.016 .018 .384
Cut Stems .101 -.009 .016 .589
Removed Dead Branches .747 -.043 .023 .067
Removed Suckers .903 -.018 .016 .272
Removed Weeds .99 -.005 .005 .312
Household Used Lime .024 .01 .009 .292
Household Used NPK .185 -.001 .02 .978
Applied Pesticides .761 -.022 .022 .33
Applied Mulch .867 -.022 .018 .221
Applied Compost .725 .017 .024 .471
Book Keeping Done .025 -.007 .008 .367
Head, Years of Schooling 3.534 -.068 .158 .669
Female Headed Household .33 .025 .025 .319
Household Size 5.018 -.039 .113 .731
Average Schooling of Household 3.257 .101 .099 .305
*
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in brackets.
All specifications control for village fixed effects.
Table 3.2: Treatment Effects on Knowledge, Adoption and Yields
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Knowledge Adoption All Audits Main Audits Leaf Defects Inv. Arcsine
Yields
Treatment 0.322∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.005 0.043∗∗ -0.029 0.029∗∗
[0.019] [0.017] [0.013] [0.020] [0.021] [0.013]
R-squared .11 .05 .03 .03 .08 .45
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4666 4666 47878 47878 47878 6143
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by household in brackets.
All columns use data from endline rounds, i.e. rounds 6 through 9 (see Appendix 3).
In columns (1)-(2), we use self-reports from the household.
In columns (3)-(5), we use tree level audit data. In column (6), we use self-reported
harvests per tree, cross-checked against yield calendar data.
Table 3.3: Treatment Effects on Input Use
Fertilizer Inputs Labor Inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Compost NPK Inv. Arcsine Inv. Arcsine
HH Labor Days Paid Labor Days
Treatment 0.014 0.019∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.002∗∗
[0.018] [0.009] [0.007] [0.001]
Control Mean 0.614 0.079 0.215 0.009
R-squared .05 .06 .19 .04
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6225 6225 6145 6145
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by household in brackets.
All columns use data from endline rounds, i.e. rounds 6 through 9 (see Appendix 2).
In all columns, we use self-reports from the household.
In columns (3)-(4), all the labor variables are measured per tree.
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Table 3.4: Diffusion of Treatment Effects on Treatment and Control Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Knowledge Adoption All Main Leaf Inv. Arc.
Audits Audits Defects Yields
Treatment Group: Friends
Treated Friends -0.005 -0.012 -0.019∗∗ -0.025∗ -0.036∗∗ 0.001
[0.018] [0.014] [0.009] [0.015] [0.015] [0.009]
Sample Friends 0.006 0.021∗ 0.013∗ 0.018 0.010 0.004
[0.013] [0.011] [0.007] [0.011] [0.010] [0.006]
Observations 2471 2471 25978 25978 25978 3261
Control Group: Friends
Treated Friends -0.001 -0.001 -0.021∗∗ -0.033∗∗ -0.004 -0.001
[0.007] [0.011] [0.009] [0.015] [0.015] [0.010]
Sample Friends 0.004 0.019∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.010 0.014∗∗
[0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.010] [0.009] [0.006]
Observations 2165 2165 21700 21700 21700 2843
Treatment Group: Neighbors
Treated Neighbors 0.024 0.021 0.004 0.013 -0.009 -0.003
[0.019] [0.015] [0.009] [0.015] [0.017] [0.009]
Sample Neighbors -0.028∗∗ -0.013 -0.008 -0.019∗ 0.001 0.007
[0.014] [0.011] [0.007] [0.010] [0.011] [0.006]
Observations 2460 2460 25783 25783 25783 3247
Control Group: Neighbors
Treated Neighbors 0.009 0.009 -0.020∗∗ -0.009 0.002 -0.013
[0.007] [0.012] [0.010] [0.015] [0.015] [0.010]
Sample Neighbors -0.007 -0.003 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.006
[0.004] [0.007] [0.007] [0.010] [0.010] [0.006]
Observations 2142 2142 21510 21510 21510 2814
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by household in brackets. Specifications control for round and village FE.
Table 3.5: Diffusion of Treatment Effects by Program Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Main Leaf Inv. Arc. Used Used
Audits Audits Defects Yields Compost NPK
Treatment Group
T Friends, Trained Together -0.015 -0.021 -0.057∗∗∗ 0.009 0.009 -0.010
[0.012] [0.017] [0.018] [0.010] [0.013] [0.009]
T Friends, Not Trained Together -0.023∗∗ -0.028 -0.009 -0.010 0.013 -0.004
[0.011] [0.018] [0.018] [0.011] [0.014] [0.011]
Sample Friends 0.013∗ 0.018 0.010 0.004 0.011 0.021∗∗∗
[0.007] [0.011] [0.010] [0.006] [0.008] [0.006]
Training Group Size 0.002 0.012 0.004 0.004 -0.004 -0.003
[0.005] [0.008] [0.009] [0.004] [0.007] [0.004]
Outcome Mean -0.002 0.027 -0.047 0.533 0.639 0.096
Observations 25978 25978 25978 3261 3300 3300
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by household in brackets.
All specifications control for round and village FE.
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Table 3.6: Program Impact on Social Networks
(1) (2) (3)
Friends in Group Friends in Group Friends in Group
In training grp. -0.124 -0.125 -0.127
× Treatment [0.089] [0.087] [0.088]
In own-village 0.046 -0.454∗∗∗
training grp. × Treatment [0.042] [0.048]
In same training 0.955∗∗∗
grp. × Treatment [0.104]
Treatment -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
× Post [0.081] [0.081] [0.081]
In training grp. 0.129∗ 0.127∗ 0.127∗
× Post [0.074] [0.074] [0.074]
In own-village 0.064∗ 0.064∗
training grp. × Post [0.035] [0.035]
In training grp. 0.014 0.007 0.007
× Treatment × Post [0.081] [0.081] [0.081]
In own-village 0.107∗∗∗ -0.020
training grp. × Treatment × Post [0.038] [0.037]
In same training 0.278∗∗∗
grp. × Treatment × Post [0.057]
Post -0.129∗ -0.129∗ -0.129∗
[0.074] [0.074] [0.074]
Control Mean 0.108 0.108 0.108
R-squared .57 .58 .6
Village × Group FE Yes Yes Yes
HHID FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 123084 123084 123084
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by village × group in brackets.
All columns use data from the baseline and round 9 social network surveys. (see
Appendix 2). The dataset has been reshaped to the household × training group level.
The outcome variable in all columns is each household’s number of friends in each
training group. An additional pseudo-group has been created for each household’s
untrained friends.
Appendix to Chapter 3.
The TechnoServe Agronomy Best Practices
The agronomy training program covered the following eight basic modules:
• Rejuvenation and pruning to produce new and productive wood. A multi-stem un-
capped system was promoted.
• Nutrition: a balanced nutritional program based on organic and inorganic additives,
with the exact requirements determined by soil analysis. It included homemade
compost, and may include liming, inorganic fertilizers and foliar feeds depending on
the requirements of the area.
• Integrated pest management: multiple techniques to manage pests and diseases,
such as correct nutrition, tree management, biological control, traps etc. Selective
pesticides used as a last resort, but safe use of pesticides promoted.
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• Weed control: management of weeds through mulching, hand weeding and/or cover
crops.
• Mulching: techniques to conserve moisture, add organic matter, and control soil
erosion.
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• Soil and water conservation: use of a number of techniques such as mulching, terrac-
ing and water traps to control soil erosion and maintain soil fertility. Encourage the
management of water resources through conservation zones.
• Shade: use of the correct level (20-40%) of shade to reduce tree stress, conserve
moisture, increase organic matter and increase biodiversity.
• Record keeping: maintenance of records of inputs, outputs, profit and loss in a record
book.
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The schedule of the modules covered in the training was as follows:
• February 2010: Record Keeping
• March 2010: Integrated Pest Management (IPM)
• April 2010: Coffee Nutrition
• May 2010: Coffee Harvesting
• June 2010: Weed Control
• July 2010: Mulching
• August 2010: Pruning and Rejuvenation
• September 2010: Safe use of pesticides
• October 2010: Composting
• November 2010: Erosion Control
• December 2010: Coffee Shade Management
• January 2011 to October 2011: Review
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Audits Data
Our main adoption measures were constructed from plot and tree inspections data, col-
lected using plot and tree audits. Field staff visited each coffee plot of all the coffee farmers
in Nyarubaka and inspected five trees, looking for signs of adoption of the agronomic prac-
tices covered in the trainings. The enumerators were given specific instructions on how
to pick the five trees on each plot. They were instructed to start at the corner of the
coffee plot closest to the farmer’s house and walk in the direction of the opposite corner.
They were then to inspect the second tree into the field, walk to the middle of the field
and inspect the tree in the middle. Starting from the middle, the field staff was to walk
towards the other two corners of the field and inspect the second tree in each direction.
The field staff was then to walk back to the middle of the field and continue on the original
path and inspect the second to last tree in the field. For each tree, the field staff would
also note the GPS coordinates of the tree.
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Data Modules Collected by Sample Type
A: RCT-Sample Modules
SECTION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cover Page X X X X X X X X X X
Consent X X X X X X X X X X
HH Roster X X X X X X X X X
Plot Roster X X X X X X X X
Household-Level Sections
HH Member Demographic Characteristics X
HH Characteristics X X X
HH Characteristics (Extended) X
Group Memberships X X
Crop Inventory X X X X X
Plot Questionnaire
Long Season X X X
Short Season X X X
Other X X X X
Labor Activities
Long Season X X X
Short Season X X X
Crop Harvests and Sales
Long Season X X X
Short Season X X X
Coffee Activites
Coffee Plot Details X X X
General Household Coffee
A. Coffee Plot Performance/Future X
B. Training X
C. Cooperative Membership X
D. Coffee Farming Activities/Practices X
Coffee Delivery X
Coffee Module
Labor Activities for Coffee X X X X X X X X X X
Coffee Harvests X X X X X X X X X
Coffee Sales X X X X X X X X X X
Coffee Inputs X X X X X X X X X
Best Practices Schedule/Training Attendance X X X
Consumption Module X X X
Household Finance
Decisionmaking - Use of Money X X X
Bank Holdings/Savings/Debts/Credits X X X
Remittances X
Bank Account Location X
Gifts X X
Non-Agricultural Income and Credit X X X X X X X
Social Networks X X X X X
Best Practices Module: Audits
Coffee Plot Measurements and ID X X X X
Best Practices Sheet X X X X
Tree and Plot Inspection X X X X
Feedback on TNS Training/Improvement of Knowledge of BP X
Barriers to Adoption of Best Practices X
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B: Non-RCT-Sample Modules
SECTION 2 3 6 7 9 10
Cover Page X X X X X X
Consent X X X X X X
HH Roster X X X
Plot Roster X X X
Household-Level Sections
HH Demographics (Basic) X




A. Coffee Plot Performance/Future X
B. Training X
C. Coffee Farming Activities/Practices X
Coffee Module
Labor Activities for Coffee X X X X
Coffee Harvests X X X X
Coffee Sales X X X X X
Coffee Inputs X X X X
Best Practices Schedule/Training Attendance X X
Consumption Module
Household Finance
Decisionmaking - Use of Money
Bank Holdings/Savings/Debts/Credits
Remittances
Bank Account Location X
Gifts
Non-Agricultural Income and Credit
Social Networks X X X X
Best Practices Module: Audits
Coffee Plot Measurements and ID X X X X
Best Practices Sheet X X X X
Tree and Plot Inspection X X X X
Feedback on TNS Training/Improvement of Knowledge of BP X
Barriers to Adoption of Best Practices X
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Timing of survey waves:
The timing of the ten survey rounds of surveys was as follows:
1. December 2009 to January 2010
2. April 2010 to May 2010
3. July 2010
4. September 2010 to October 2010
5. November 2010
6. January 2011 to February 2011
7. June 2011 to July 2011
8. October 2011
9. January 2012 to February 2012
10. September 2012 to October 2012
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Yield Calendars
HHID:   VILLAGE:             NAME:   
LOCATION:   















   
  
  
   
  
  
   
  
  
   
  
 
  MAY (05) DAY 
Write here the coffee 
harvest that you have just 
weighed 
Write here the coffee harvest that you are going to 
sell and indicate the type of coffee (cherries, wet or 
dry parch)  
1 1-MAY-2012 TUESDAY   Kg  Kg 
2 2-MAY-2012 WEDNESDAY   Kg  Kg 
3 3-MAY-2012 THURSDAY   Kg  Kg 
4 4-MAY-2012 FRIDAY   Kg  Kg 
5 5-MAY-2012 SATURDAY   Kg  Kg 
6 6-MAY-2012 SUNDAY   Kg  Kg 
7 7-MAY-2012 MONDAY    Kg  Kg 
8 8-MAY-2012 TUESDAY   Kg  Kg 
9 9-MAY-2012 WEDNESDAY   Kg  Kg 
10 10-MAY-2012 THURSDAY   Kg  Kg 
11 11-MAY-2012 FRIDAY   Kg  Kg 
12 12-MAY-2012 SATURDAY   Kg  Kg 
13 13-MAY-2012 SUNDAY   Kg  Kg 
14 14-MAY-2012 MONDAY    Kg  Kg 
15 15-MAY-2012 TUESDAY   Kg  Kg 
16 16-MAY-2012 WEDNESDAY   Kg  Kg 
17 17-MAY-2012 THURSDAY   Kg  Kg 
18 18-MAY-2012 FRIDAY   Kg  Kg 
19 19-MAY-2012 SATURDAY   Kg  Kg 
20 20-MAY-2012 SUNDAY   Kg  Kg 
21 21-MAY-2012 MONDAY    Kg  Kg 
22 22-MAY-2012 TUESDAY   Kg  Kg 
23 23-MAY-2012 WEDNESDAY   Kg  Kg 
24 24-MAY-2012 THURSDAY   Kg  Kg 
25 25-MAY-2012 FRIDAY   Kg  Kg 
26 26-MAY-2012 SATURDAY   Kg  Kg 
27 27-MAY-2012 SUNDAY   Kg  Kg 
28 28-MAY-2012 MONDAY    Kg  Kg 
29 29-MAY-2012 TUESDAY   Kg  Kg 
30 30-MAY-2012 WEDNESDAY   Kg  Kg 
31 31-MAY-2012 THURSDAY   Kg  Kg 
 
1. Hang the scale to a fix and stable place ; 
2. Hang the bag (with the cherries in it) to the scale ; 
3. Read the number on the scale. 
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